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NOTE
What I Tell You Three Times Is True:
U.S. Courts and Pre-Award Interim
Measures Under the New York
Convention'
INTRODUCTION
"Parties who submit their disputes to arbitration expect the pro-
ceedings to be private, expeditious, and final."'2 The common wis-
dom takes this to mean that parties choose arbitration for its
temporal and financial economies.3 Those who engage in transna-
tional commercial activities, however, find in arbitration something
even more valuable: party autonomy.4 The ability to specify the
1. In The Hunting of Snark, the Bellman informs his crew "[w]hat I tell you three times
is true." Lewis Carroll, The Hunting of the Snark, in Rhyme? And Reason? 134 (1887).
United States courts have followed a similar approach in establishing the New York
Convention's article IH(3), accomplishing their task more through the cumulative effect of
pronouncements than by investigation of objective indicia, such as the New York
Convention's drafting history.
2. D. W. Shenton, Attachments and Other Interim Court Remedies in Support of
Arbitration: The English Courts, 14 Int'l Bus. Law. 101, 101 (1984).
3. Michael Burrows & Lawrence W. Newman, Attachment in Aid of Arbitration,
N.Y.LJ., Dec. 30,1982, at 1; Douglas D. Reichert, Provisional Remedies in the Context of
International Commercial Arbitration, 3 Int'l Tax & Bus. Law. 368, 369 (1986); David L.
Zicherman, Note, The Use of Pre-Judgment Attachments and Temporary Injunctions in
International Commercial Arbitration Proceedings: A Comparative Analysis of the British
and American Approaches, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 667, 667 (1989) (citing Reichert, supra).
4. Colleen C. Higgins, Interim Measures in Transnational Maritime Arbitration, 65 Tul.
L. Rev. 1519, 1520 (1991).
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forum, procedure and substantive rules that will apply to future
disputes provides a welcome measure of security for business peo-
ple who set out for uncharted waters.5 With the stroke of a pen,
they can immunize themselves against the misfortune of settling
subsequent differences in hostile fora and in accordance with unfa-
miliar rules.
Autonomy in arbitration, however, is not synonymous with arbi-
tral exclusivity. Although parties desire to sequester the merits of
their disputes from the reach of courts, parties nonetheless depend
on judges to secure the integrity of their agreements to arbitrate.
From start to finish, courts stand ready to take action in support of
arbitration. When necessary, courts may order arbitration,8
appoint arbitrators,' compel the appearance of witnesses 10 and
enforce awards." Indeed, one doubts whether anyone would turn
to arbitration in the absence of this complementary relationship.
This Note examines one portion of the confluence between liti-
gation and arbitration-the competence of courts to order pre-
award attachments under the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, com-
monly known as the New York Convention (or Convention).12
Because of the strategic importance of pre-award attachments, 3
5. Christine & Patrick Thieffry, Negotiating Settlement of Disputes Provisions in
International Business Contracts: Recent Developments in Arbitration and Other
Processes, 45 Bus. Law. 577, 622-23 (1990).
6. Higgins, supra note 4, at 1522.
7. Id. at 1522, 1546; William W. Park, National Law and Commercial Justice:
Safeguarding Procedural Integrity in International Arbitration, 63 Tul. L. Rev. 647, 656-57
(1989); Shenton, supra note 2, at 101.
8. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988) (chapter 1 of the FAA); The
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C.
§ 206 (1988) (chapter 2 of the FAA); The United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, art. 11(3), 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Convention].
9. 9 U.S.C. §§ 5, 206.
10. 9 U.S.C. § 7.
11. 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 207; Convention. supra note 8, art. III.
12. Convention. supra note 8.
13. By preventing dissipation or transfer of assets, pre-award attachments preserve the
status quo ante. This, in turn, guarantees the ultimate satisfaction of an award. Depriving
arbitration of this form of judicial assistance means stripping it of the certainty that makes
it an attractive alternative to litigation. See Murray Oil Prods. Co. v. Mitsui & Co., 146
F.2d 381, 384 (2d Cir. 1944); Charles N. Brower & W. Michael Thpman, Court-Ordered
Provisional Measures under the New York Convention, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 24,28-29 (1986);
Higgins, supra note 4, at 1520-22, 1525; Michael F. Hoellering, Interim Relief in Aid of
International Commercial Arbitration, 1984 Wis. Int'l L.J. 1, 1; William P. Mills, III, Note,
State International Arbitration Statutes and the U.S. Arbitration Act: Unifying the
NEW YORK CONVENTION
courts and commentators have visited these waters frequently over
the past two decades. During their expeditions, jurists and scholars
have posed and responded to a single question: in light of the Con-
vention's silence regarding pre-award interim measures, what
meaning should we ascribe to its vague provision on arbitral
clauses? Some conclude that the Convention should permit courts
to order pre-award attachments.' 4 Others argue that courts should
not possess the authority to grant such measures because it would
contradict the Convention's spirit and obscure language.' 5 Unfor-
tunately, in their haste to explain what the law ought to be, both
sides of the debate virtually ignore the issue that should be the
point of departure: what is the law?
The purposes of this Note are twofold. First, by exposing incon-
sistencies in the United States' case law on the competence of
courts to grant pre-award attachments under the Convention, it
emphasizes the pressing need in U.S. jurisprudence for resolution
of this issue. This Note argues that by spinning a web of conflicting
precedent and inexplicable exceptions, U.S. courts have increased
the cost of private dispute resolution in international transactions.
In most transactions, the additional costs take the form of "risk
premiums" exacted for uncertainty regarding the availability of
provisional measures in future arbitrations. Once an arbitration
has commenced, however, uncertainty costs translate into attorney
fees as the parties-now adversaries-battle over the Conven-
tion's meaning, the applicability of recognized exceptions and the
existence of proposed exceptions. Until courts adopt-a uniform,
principled approach in answering "what is the law?" businesses
Availability of Interim Relief, 13 Fordham Int'l L.J. 604, 623-24 (1989-1990); Zicherman.
supra note 3, at 668.
14. Carolina Power & Light v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044, 1049-52 (N.D. Cal. 1977);
Joseph D. Becker, Attachments in Aid of International Arbitration-The American
Position, 1 Arb. Int'l 40, 42 (1985); Brower & Tuipman, supra note 13, at 25; Hoellering,
supra note 13, at 8-12; Reichert, supra note 3, at 388-89; Kevin Brody, Note, 18 Cornell J.
Int'l L. 99, 101 (1985); Mills, supra note 13, at 630-35; Zicherman, supra note 3, at 692-99;
Burrows & Newman, supra note 3, at 2.
15. I.T.A.D. Assoc. v. Podar Bros., 636 F.2d 75,75-77 (4th Cir. 1981); McCreary Tire &
Rubber Co. v. CEAT, S.p.A., 501 F.2d 1032, 1032-33, 1037-38 (3d Cir. 1974); Cooper v.
Ateliers de la Motobecane, 442 N.E.2d 1239, 1242-43 (N.Y. 1982); Neil E. McDonell, The
Availability of Provisional Relief in International Commercial Arbitration, 22 Colum. J.
Transnat'l L. 273,289 (1984) (preferring McCreary generally, but suggesting a case-by-case
approach); Andrew S. Holmes, Note, Pre-Award Attachment Under the U.N. Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 21 Va. J. Int'l L 785,
801-03 (1981); John B. Yelliot, Note, Attachment Under the United Nations Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 36 Wash. & Lee L Rev.
1135, 1143-44 (1979).
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cannot take full advantage of the Convention's potential to reduce
uncertainty costs.
Second, this Note demonstrates that the Convention's lineage
and travaux prdparatoires, heretofore ignored by U.S. judges and
scholars, prove that the Convention should be interpreted so as to
allow courts the jurisdiction sufficient to order pre-award
attachments.
Part I briefly describes U.S. law pertaining to the availability of
pre-award attachments under chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA),'16 which governed most commercial arbitration agree-
ments prior to ratification of the Convention and still controls arbi-
tral clauses not subject to the Convention. This part also
introduces the reader to the Convention's text and summarizes the
three seminal U.S. cases on the power of courts to order pre-award
attachments under the Convention. Because twenty years' worth
of debate has generated substantial analysis of these three cases,
Part I discusses them only to provide a basic background regarding
their facts and holdings.
Part II provides a comprehensive review of current U.S. law
regarding judicial competence to order pre-award attachments
under the Convention, as implemented in the United States by
chapter 2 of the FAA. Part II(A) sets forth a circuit-by-circuit
examination of the conclusions reached by courts in the wake of
the decisions discussed in Part I. This section has two aims. First,
it calls attention to the failure of U.S. courts to consult the Conven-
tion's drafting history. Second, Part II(A) illustrates how this fail-
ure to develop a coherent and uniform rule has led to an
unfortunate split of authority-both between and within the
circuits.
In similar fashion, Part II(B) presents an analysis of the recog-
nized and suggested exceptions to the line of cases holding that the
Convention divests courts of jurisdiction to order pre-award
attachments. These exceptions add another dimension of uncer-
tainty to U.S. doctrine and, unintentionally, considerably damage
the Convention's integrity. Part II concludes that the chaotic state
of U.S. law calls for a definitive resolution of the debate concerning
the availability of pre-award attachments under the Convention.
To this end, Part III first explores the English interpretation of
the Convention's position on this issue, then probes the Conven-
16. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
[Vol. 35:971
NEw YORK CONVENTION
tion's travaux prdparatoires in an attempt to provide the definitive
answer called for in Part II. Part III(A) explains that English
courts have never doubted that the Convention permits them to
order interim measures prior to the issuance of awards. It con-
cludes by considering what has enabled English courts to avoid
controversy in this matter and what U.S. courts can learn from
their experience.
Part III(B) recounts how England became a party to the Geneva
Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of 192317 (Geneva Protocol or
Protocol) and participated actively in drafting the New York Con-
vention.' Because the United States did neither,19 its judges and
scholars have remained uninformed about the Convention's ante-
cedents and travaux. This ignorance, in turn, explains the enduring
controversy regarding the jurisdiction of courts to order pre-award
attachments under the Convention.20
The contrasting readiness of English courts to grant pre-award
attachments in appropriate circumstances stems from their coun-
try's intimate understanding of the Convention's travaux and the
Geneva Protocol. Unlike the United States' institutional memory,
England's recalls that article 11(3) of the Convention reenacted
article IV of the Geneva Protocol. It also understands that this
latter provision left courts in possession of jurisdiction sufficient for
the purpose of ordering pre-award interim measures. Part HI con-
cludes that if U.S. judges and commentators had undertaken a seri-
ous inquiry into the Convention's travaux, they could have spared
arbitrating parties from the increased risks and costs associated
with the uncertainty of securing provisional measures in aid of
arbitration.
17. Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, Sept. 24, 1923,27 L.N.T.S. 157 [hereinafter
Geneva Protocol]; see English Arbitration Clauses (Protocol) Act, 1924, § 1(1) and
Schedule (text of the Protocol on Arbitration Clauses), reprinted in I Halsbury's Statutes
470-71 (1929).
18. See G. Winthrop Haight, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards 21-26 (1958); Paolo Contini, International Commercial
Arbitration, 8 Am. J. Comp. L. 283,290 n.33 (1959); Leonard V. Quigley, Accession by the
United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 Yale LJ. 1049, 1063 (1961).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 226, 298-99.
20. I do not suggest that once informed of the Convention's drafting history, courts
would (or should) make generous use of their power to order pre-award interim measures.
I merely argue that the drafting history settles their audiority to make such orders in
appropriate cases.
1995]
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I. INTERIM MEASURES UNDER CHAPTER ONE OF THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT AND SEMINAL CASES INTERPRETING
ARTICLE 11(3) OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION
A. Chapter One of the FAA
Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 192521 as
a vehicle to reverse the common law view of arbitration as ousting
the jurisdiction of courts.' Although the framers of the FAA
sought to "assure those who desired arbitration ...that their
expectations would not be undermined by federal judges, '23 the
FAA did not banish courts from hearing actions in aid of arbitra-
tion. Thus, section 4 grants courts the power to compel arbitra-
tion.2 4 Section 5 confers on courts the authority to appoint
arbitrators?25 Section 7 instructs courts to issue summonses to wit-
nesses whose presence is required in an arbitration. 6 Section 10
grants to courts marginal powers to review the validity of awards.2 7
Finally, section 9 authorizes courts to issue orders confirming
awards,
The text of the FAA presents no authoritative response to the
question of whether or not Congress intended to include interim
measures in the judicial framework supporting private arbitration.
Section 8 of the Act specifically authorizes courts to grant attach-
ments pending arbitration of suits that would otherwise be heard in
admiralty. 29 Courts might have interpreted this provision as pro-
viding an exclusion of interim measures in other circumstances.
Only one jurisdiction, however, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, has both adopted and stood by this
decision in its reported cases. 30 The clear weight of authority holds
that pre-award attachment is an important right of arbitrating
parties.
21. Federal Arbitration Act, cl. 213, §§ 1-15, 43 Stat. 883, 883-85 (1925) (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. 88 1-16 (1988)).
22. H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924).
23. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1983) (quoting Metro Industrial Painting
Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d Cir. 1961)).
24. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
25. 9 U.S.C. § 5.
26. 9 U.S.C. § 7.
27. 9 U.S.C. § 10.
28. 9 U.S.C. § 9.
29. 9 U.S.C. § 8.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 44-45 (discussing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, 726 F.2d 1286, 1291 (8th Cir. 1984)).
[Vol. 35:971
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Speaking for the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, Judge Learned Hand became the first to make this deter-
mination in the context of international arbitration. The case,
Murray Oil Prods. Co. v. Mitsui & Co., involved a breach of con-
tract action brought by a U.S. company against a Japanese supplier
of oil.31 Because the contract contained an arbitration clause, the
Japanese supplier moved to stay the court action and liquidate an
attachment granted by a state court.3 2 The federal district court
stayed the litigation but refused to liquidate the attachment.33
On appeal, Judge Hand agreed that "an arbitration clause does
not deprive a promisee of the usual provisional remedies."' a He
cited two reasons for this conclusion. First, he considered arbitra-
tion to be but another form of trial, which should not displace the
standard mechanisms used for preserving the status quo.35 Second,
he acknowledged that many parties choose arbitration for its abil-
ity to provide parties with an expeditious expert decision. 6
Although these statements may not seem wholly consistent with
one another, they nonetheless led Judge Hand to find that interim
measures are compatible with an agreement to arbitrate. Judge
Hand reasoned that if parties seek the speedy decision of a special-
ist, they must also desire effective recovery upon the issuance of an
award.37 Because interim measures serve this function, a court
may grant them despite an agreement to arbitrate.as
State courts also used statutes identical to chapter I of the FAA
to justify attachments, despite the presence of arbitration clauses in
international contracts.39 In American Reserve Ins. Co. v. China
Ins. Co., the New York Court of Appeals upheld an attachment
obtained by a U.S. reinsurer against a Chinese insurer who had
defaulted on a premium.' Surprised by the defendant's suggestion
that the arbitration clause barred attachment proceedings, the
31. Murray Oil Prods. Co. v. Mitsui Co., 146 F.2d 381, 382 (2d Cir. 1944).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 384.
35. Id. at 383.
36. Id. at 384.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. The language in § 5 of New York's Arbitration Law of 1920, later enacted as § 1451
of the Civil Practice Act, was essentially identical to that in § 3 of the FAA. See 9 U.S.C.
§ 3.
40. American Reserve Ins. Co. v. China Ins. Co., 79 N.E.2d 435, 426 (N.Y. 1948).
1995)
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court wrote that "it is not even proper.., in such an action to
plead the arbitration agreement as a defense. "41
Three U.S. courts have found a situation in which it is per se
improper to grant interim relief. In Greenwich Marine v. S.S. Alex-
andra, the Second Circuit held that although section 4 of the FAA
permits a court to order arbitration, it does not authorize the court
to order a defendant to post security.42 Speaking for the court,
Judge Marshall reasoned that although section 8 specifically per-
mits courts to order provisional measures in admiralty cases, sec-
tion 4 offers no authority for extending this to a broader range of
cases.4 3 A convenient silence on Murray Oil also facilitated Judge
Marshall's reasoning.
Dormant for nearly two decades, this line of reasoning resur-
faced in the United States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and
Tenth Circuits a decade ago.44 In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, the Eighth Circuit found interim relief inap-
propriate because the "judicial inquiry requisite to determine the
propriety of... relief.., would inject the court into the merits of
issues more appropriately left to the arbitrator. 4 5
Although the Second Circuit first articulated this interpretation
of section 4 of the FAA, it has since reversed itself. In Roso-Lino
Beverage Distrib., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of New York, the
Second Circuit held that a court may grant interim relief in order
to maintain the status quo between arbitrating parties. 46 The
United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Third, Fourth, Sev-
enth and Ninth Circuits have long shared the Second Circuit's
revised understanding of section 4.47 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has declined to choose between the
41. Id. at 427.
42. Greenwich Marine v. S.S. Alexandra, 339 F.2d 901, 903-04 (2d Cir. 1965) (citing 9
U.S.C. § 4).
43. Id. at 904 n.1 (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 4, 8).
44. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, 726 F.2d 1286, 1291 (8th Cir.
1984) (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Scott, No. 83-1480 (10th Cir.
May 12, 1983) (summary order to stay injunction during pending arbitration)).
45. Id. at 1292.
46. Roso-Lino Beverage Distrib., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of New York, 749 F.2d
124, 125 (2d Cir. 1984).
47. Ortho Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 882 F.2d 806, 812 (3d Cir. 1989); PMS
Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Huber & Shuner, A.G., 863 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1988); Teradyne v.
Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d 43, 51 (1st Cir. 1986); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
v. Bradley, 756 F.2d 1048, 1052 (4th Cir. 1985); Sauer-Getriebe KG v. White Hydraulics,
Inc., 715 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1070 (1984).
[Vol. 35:971
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Hovey and Roso-Lino schools of thought.¢s Instead, it upheld the
district court's decision to grant interim relief on the ground that
the parties' arbitration agreement expressly provided for the main-
tenance of the status quo pending an award.4 9 The court recog-
nized, however, that this remedy dovetails with the FAA's policy of
expediting arbitration. 0 This suggests that the Fifth Circuit also
would adhere to the Second Circuit's revised stance on the availa-
bility of pre-award interim measures in chapter 1 cases.
Thus, there is a minor split between the circuits regarding the
availability of interim measures under chapter 1 of the FAA. Some
precedent supports the view that courts ordering arbitration under
section 4 must completely divest themselves of jurisdiction over the
matter. According to this view, interim measures are not available
to arbitrating parties. Most authority, however, endorses the posi-
tion that because Congress desired the FAA to enforce arbitration
agreements, it implicitly condoned the maintenance of the status
quo as a means of preserving the meaningfulness of the arbitral
process.5 '
In summary, Congress promulgated the FAA in order to prevent
courts from interfering with valid arbitration agreements. Nonethe-
less, it authorized courts to intervene in arbitrations for the pur-
pose of securing their integrity. Despite Congress' general silence
on the issue of interim measures, most U.S. courts of appeals have
interpreted chapter 1 of the FAA as sanctioning the use of such
remedies for the purpose of supporting domestic and international
arbitrations.
B. Seminal Cases on the Effect of Article 11(3) of the New York
Convention
Few use the New York Convention's official title: The United
Nations Convention on the Enforcement and Recognition of For--
eign Arbitral Awards.52 True to its full name, the Convention pro-
vides comprehensive standards for the enforcement of arbitral
awards.5 3 The treaty, however, sheds only dim light on arbitral
48. RGI, Inc. v. Tucker & Associates, Inc., 858 F.2d 227, 230 (5th Cir. 1988).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 229.
51. See, e.g., Teradyne, 797 F.2d at 51.
52. See Convention, supra note 8.
53. See id. arts. III, IV, V, VI.
1995]
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agreements. Only article II, inserted on the last working day of the
drafting conference, 4 mentions arbitral agreements:
The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an
action in a matter in respect of which the parties have
made an agreement [to arbitrate shall,] at the request of
one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it
finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative
or incapable of being performed.5
Even this provision offers no meaningful guidance to courts
presented with a petition for interim measures in a dispute subject
to an arbitration clause. Thus, in the absence of a working knowl-
edge of the article's drafting history, judges are left to ponder its
vague instruction.
The Convention's drafters may have successfully provided a uni-
form standard for the enforcement of arbitral awards. On the
other hand, their elliptical instructions as to the enforcement of
arbitral agreements have left U.S. jurisdictions in discord. Whether
an arbitrating party can petition a court for interim measures varies
with jurisdictional borders. Thus, in some U.S. courts, parties have
access to provisional measures, whereas in others, they do not.
Some jurisdictions present litigants with even more disquieting
uncertainty, namely intra-circuit splits of authority. The U.S. expe-
rience with this aspect of the Convention has not been one of tre-
mendous success.
In 1974, the Third Circuit became the first appellate court to rule
on whether the availability of interim measures established in Mur-
ray Oil had survived U.S. ratification of the New York Convention.
In McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT S.p.A, a U.S. company
secured an attachment and brought a breach of contract action
against an Italian corporation in Pennsylvania state court. 6 The
Italian corporation removed the action to federal court, and citing
the contract's arbitration clause, it then requested the district court
to stay the litigation and to liquidate the attachment. 7 The district
court denied both motions. 8
On appeal, the Third Circuit granted the stay and liquidated the
attachment. In a brief portion of the opinion, the court gave three
54. McDonell, supra note 15, at 288; Holmes, supra note 15, at 790-91.
55. Convention, supra note 8, art. 11(3).
56. McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT, S.p.A., 501 F.2d 1032, 1033 (3d Cir. 1974).
57. Id.
58. Id.
[Vol. 35:971
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reasons for vacating the attachment. It did not, however, discuss
whether or not the Convention's drafting history would support
these arguments. First, the court found that the Convention's
instruction to "refer the parties to arbitration" prevented it from
granting interim relief.59 The court agreed that section 3 of the
FAA allows such interim measures because it commands only a
stay of litigation, after which a court retains sufficient jurisdiction
to maintain an attachment. 60 The court asserted, however, that the
phrase "refer" prevents a court in a chapter 2 proceeding from pre-
serving any residual jurisdiction over the matter.61 In other words,
because chapter 1 of the FAA applies to international arbitrations
only to the extent that it does not conflict with the Convention,62
the Third Circuit considered itself unable to uphold the attach-
ment. Second, it reasoned that an attachment represents an
attempt to bypass the agreed method of dispute resolution.6 Curi-
ously, the court did not attempt to explain why it had concluded
that the same does not hold true for cases falling under chapter 1 of
the FAA.64 Finally, the court announced that the application of
attachment procedures, which vary from state to state, would
impede the Convention's full implementation.6
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1038.
61. Id. But see Carolina Power & Light v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044, 1051 (N.D. Cal.
1977) (criticizing McCreary's logic); Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, 442 N.E.2d
1239, 1242 (N.Y. 1982).
62. 9 U.S.C. § 208.
63. McCreary, 501 F.2d at 1038.
64. Id. ("Un/ike § 3 of the federal Act, article 11(3) of the Convention provides that the
court of a contracting state shall 'refer the parties to arbitration' rather than 'stay the...
action.'") (emphasis added); see also Ortho Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 882
F.2d 806,812 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that pre-award attachments are available in chapter 1
cases).
65. McCreary, 501 F.2d at 1038. The court's hostility towards the idea of subjecting
chapter 2 actions to local procedural rules is puzzling. The drafters of the Convention
actually rejected a proposal to insert uniform procedural rules into its text. United
Nations, Economic and Social Council, United Nations Conference on International and
Commercial Arbitration, Comments on Draft Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Note by the Secretary-General at 4, U.N. Doc.
E/CONF.26/2 (1958). Instead, they suggested that this concern could best be addressed
through the promulgation of model laws. Id. at 5-6. As a result, seven provisions of the
Convention contemplate the injection of local substantive and procedural rules. In some
cases, it is not clear which municipal law a court must apply. It is apparent, however, that
the court is to employ some local, perhaps eccentric, standard.
For example, article HI(1) requires courts to recognize an agreement to arbitrate a
"subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration." Convention, supra note 8.
Article 1(3) directs courts to refer the parties to arbitration "unless it finds that the...
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed." Id.
1995]
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Thus, the first U.S. court to consider the issue held that judges
applying the New York Convention lack the authority to grant pre-
award interim measures. One might discount McCreary as the
opinion of a court unfamiliar with international trade; however, the
Fourth Circuit's concurrence 66 is hard to explain on these grounds.
It becomes even more difficult to maintain this position when con-
sidering the New York Court of Appeals' decision to follow the
Third Circuit in Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane.67
In Cooper, a U.S. company and a French company had created a
third corporation to distribute the French company's products in
the United States.68 The contract, which contained an arbitration
clause, provided that the French company would repurchase on
request the U.S. company's shares in the third corporation.69
When the French company refused to honor the agreement, the
U.S. company brought a contract action and secured an attachment
against the French company.70 Relying on the arbitration clause,
the French company moved to dismiss the action and liquidate the
attachment.71 After the Court of Appeals ordered arbitration, the
trial court liquidated the attachment.72 The Appellate Division
reversed this decision.73 Marshalling nine reasons for its decision,
Article III instructs contracting states to "recognize arbitral awards as binding and
enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is
relied upon." Id.
Article V(1)(a) allows courts to set aside an award if the parties "were, under the law
applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the ... agreement is not valid under the law
to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of
the country where the award was made." Id.
Article V(1)(d) authorizes courts to refuse to recognize an award if the arbitral
procedure has not been conducted in accordance with the agreement of the parties, "or,
failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the
arbitration took place." Id.
Article V(2)(a) permits courts not to enforce an award if they find that the subject
matter of the dispute is not arbitrable under local law. Id.
Article V(2)(b) provides that courts may refuse to recognize an award that is contrary to
public policy. Id.
The foregoing should sufficiently demonstrate that the Convention's drafters had no
intention of isolating it from the vagaries of municipal laws.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 107-12 (discussing I.T.A.D. Assoc. v. Podar Bros.,
636 F.2d 75, 76-77 (4th Cir. 1981)).
67. Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, 442 N.E.2d 1239 (N.Y. 1982).
68. Id. at 1240.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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none of which it based on the Convention's travaix, the Court of
Appeals reinstated the order of the trial court.
First, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Third Circuit that the
plain language of article 11(3) prevented it from retaining any juris-
diction over an action subsequent to referring the parties to arbi-
tration.74 Second, the court followed the Third Circuit's decision
that the Convention was designed to allow parties to avoid the
vagaries of state law.75 The Court of Appeals added a third and
original legal argument, reasoning that because the Convention
expressly provides for attachment only in an action to enforce an
award, the framers must have intended courts to abstain from such
interference until after an arbitrator had decided the merits of the
dispute.76
In addition, the Court of Appeals advanced six policy arguments
for its decision. First, it explained that the essence of arbitration is
the resolution of disputes without judicial interference.77 Second,
it reasoned that because arbitration is based on voluntary arrange-
ments and is usually followed by voluntary compliance with
awards, attachment is not normally necessary.78 Third, because an
award may be executed in any country party to the Convention,
there is no need for pre-award attachment even in the absence of
voluntary compliance.79 Fourth, to the extent that parties do need
74. Id. at 1242.
75. Id. at 1240.
76. Id. at 1242. This argument, however, makes little sense in light of Murray Oil and its
progeny. See supra part I.A. (interpreting chapter 1 of the FAA to allow recourse to pre-
award interim measures despite the fact that § 8 of the Act provides explicitly for them
only in admiralty cases).
77. Cooper, 442 N.E.2d at 1243. On this point, the court simply misconstrued the nature
of arbitration. Brower & Tupman, supra note 13, at 33-34; Higgins, supra note 4, at 1522,
1546; Park, supra note 7, at 656-57; Reichert, supra note 3. at 389; Shenton, supra note 2,
at 101 (noting that English common law and the Arbitration Acts of 1950 and 1979 give
English courts the power to issue orders securing the amount in dispute). From start to
finish, courts exercise their powers to give force to arbitration clauses. See supra text
accompanying notes 8-11.
78. Cooper, 442 N.E.2d at 1242 (citing Contini, supra note 18, at 309 n.84, for the
proposition that parties voluntarily comply with awards 85% of the time). Experts have
doubted the validity of this figure. Brower & Tbpman, supra note 13, at 32 n.67. Even
assuming that the court correctly stated the figure, it does not explain why interim
measures should not be available in the 15% of cases in which they are manifestly
necessary.
79. Cooper, 442 N.E.2d at 1242. Even if this were true, many states that are party to the
Convention have more restricted discovery and greater protection of proprietary
information than does the United States. Paul Stephan, et al., International Business and
Economics 209-11 (1993). In fact states such as Australia, Bermuda, Canada, the Ca)mTan
Islands, France, Germany, Liechtenstein, Norway, Panama, Singapore, Switzerland and the
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security, they can contract for performance bonds. 80 Fifth, it would
be contrary to the Convention's purpose to subject a foreign entity
to local procedures with which it may not be familiar.81 Finally, the
court suggested that if U.S. courts subject foreign entities to unfa-
miliar procedures, U.S. companies operating overseas will face
reciprocal treatment.82
Despite the volume of arguments that have been offered to
demonstrate the Convention's prohibition of pre-award attach-
ments, not all U.S. courts have been swayed by their content. Like
McCreary and Cooper, however, courts that have upheld the use of
pre-award attachments have relied upon the Convention's text and
policy arguments rather than upon the Convention's travaux.
In Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California became the first
court to reject explicitly the Third Circuit's decision in McCreary.83
A North Carolina utility had entered into a ten-year contract with
a French uranium supplier.84 After a dramatic rise in the market
United Kingdom all have "blocking statutes," which are designed to frustrate the
disclosure of business information in U.S. litigation. Id. Even the European Union's
Commission is considering such a measure. Id. In anticipation of an adverse award, a
defendant might spread its assets among related entities so as to hinder discovery of their
location. At a minimum, the freedom to do this increases defendants' settlement leverage.
80. Cooper, 442 N.E.2d at 1242. Yet, this directly confounds parties which have chosen
arbitration as a means of reducing transaction costs. In keeping with the parties' desire to
reduce these, it makes sense to have them post security only when necessary, which is the
purpose of interim measures.
81. Id. It is surprising that a court might argue that ignorance is a basis for immunizing
defendants from the laws of the jurisdictions where they keep their assets, especially
because many foreigners choose to hold their assets in the United States so that they may
benefit from our political stability. Richard L. Kaplan, Creeping Xenophobia and the
Taxation of Foreign-Owned Real Estate, 71 Geo. L.J. 1091, 1123 (1983).
In any event, it seems more equitable to subject foreigners' locally held assets to
domestic law than it does to require U.S. parties to execute awards in fora with whose laws
they may be unfamiliar.
82. Cooper, 442 N.E.2d at 1243. Unfortunately, the court failed to understand that U.S.
companies already face this danger. See Joseph D. Becker, Attachments in Aid of
International Arbitration-The American Position, 1 Arb. Int'l 42, 48 (1985) (noting a
recent series of studies documenting the use of injunctions in Europe); Brower & Tpman,
supra note 13, at 32; Burrows & Newman, supra note 3, at 2; Reichert, supra note 3, at 390-
91. Indeed, only the United States has produced a judicial opinion holding that article
11(3) prohibits courts from dispensing pre-award interim measures. 2 0. Delaume,
Transnational Contract 76-77 (1990); Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Arbitration
Convention of 1958, at 143 (1981); Curtis E. Pew & Robert M. Jarvis, Pre-Award
Attachment in International Arbitration: The Law in New York, 7 J. Int'l Arb, 31, 31
(1990).
83. Carolina Power & Light v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
84. Id. at 1045.
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price of uranium, the French supplier refused to perform under the
terms of the contract and, in accordance with their contract, the
parties commenced arbitration in New York.85 Despite the French
company's cooperation, the U.S. utility feared that it would be
unable to execute the award in the United States.86 Therefore, it
brought an attachment action against the French company's single
U.S. asset, an $85 million debt in California.87 Citing McCreary as
precedent, the French company argued that the maintenance of an
attachment would violate the Convention.s8
The district court rejected McCreary on several grounds. First, it
argued that the language of article 11(3) is not materially different
from that of section 3 of the FAA.89 In doing so, the court specu-
lated that any difference between the words "stay" and "refer"
could be explained by the fact that the Convention was intended to
apply to a multitude of legal systems.90 The court reasoned that in
some circumstances a judicial authority might not understand the
term "stay", which is a term of art peculiar to Anglo-American
common law.91 Second, even if "refer" means something stronger
than "stay," the availability of interim measures should not be pro-
hibited. Indeed, the court argued, section 4 of the FAA (which
allows courts to order parties to proceed to arbitration) has never
been understood to prevent a court from exercising "continuing
jurisdiction." 92 Third, it noted that none of the Convention's provi-
sions expressly prohibit pre-award attachments. 93 Fourth, it found
no basis for the argument that the Convention's provision for
removal to federal court reflects a bias against subjecting arbitrat-
ing parties to the vagaries of state law.9 Finally, the court recalled
that the Supreme Court had reversed its former hostility to the
availability of interim measures in the context of labor
arbitrations.95
Although the Carolina Power & Light court manifested a greater
sensitivity to the need to construe the language of article 11(3) in
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1045-46.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1050.
89. Id. at 1051.
90. Id. at 1051-52.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1052 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 4).
93. Id. at 1051.
94. Id. at 1052.
95. Id. (citing Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970)).
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light of the circumstances in which it was drafted, the court's con-
struction still did not rely upon legislative history.
II. DOCTRINAL SHATTER ZONES
A. A Murky Split of Authority
Twenty-two years have passed since the Third Circuit decided
McCreary and nineteen have expired since the Northern District of
California declined to follow the Third Circuit's wisdom. Time,
however, has neither resolved the differences between the two
lines of cases nor provided a clear split of authority. Because the
availability of pre-award attachments has an enormous effect on
the meaningfulness of the arbitral process, this section reviews the
post-McCreary precedent existing in each circuit. In so doing, it
uncovers an uncertain three-way split of authority. First, with vary-
ing degrees of clarity, the First, Third, Fourth, Eight and Tenth Cir-
cuits appear to have aligned themselves with McCreary. Second,
precedent from the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth,
Sixth and Ninth Circuits indicates greater sympathy for Carolina
Power & Light. Third, the Second and Seventh Circuits have pro-
duced conflicting authority on the jurisdiction of courts to grant
interim measures under the Convention. To date, the United
States Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh and District of Colum-
bia Circuits have never addressed the issue and therefore offer no
guidance in this matter. This lack of clarity leaves parties in the
uncomfortable position of not knowing ex ante whether the local
district court will order an attachment in aid of future arbitrations.
Thus, a significant portion of "the bottom line" will become certain
only after a dispute arises, at which time each party will have to
investigate the other's amenability to suit in various jurisdictions,
the current location of the other party's assets and the likely out-
come of the simultaneous litigation in jurisdictions adhering to dif-
ferent views of the Convention.9 6
96. Although this subpart discusses federal courts' divergent views with regard to article
11(3), the issue's complexity grows if state courts are considered. Because state courts
need not defer to federal courts' interpretations of treaties, New York courts could adhere
to Cooper even if the Second Circuit repudiated McCreary. Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 112 cmt. a (1987) [hereinafter Restatement];
see also Smith v. Wisconsin Dep't of Agric., Trade & Consumer Protection, 23 F.3d 1134,
1139 n.10 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that Seventh Circuit interpretations of federal law do not
bind state courts); United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (7th
Cir. 1970) (holding that though Supreme Court precedent binds state courts on questions
of federal law, the decisions of inferior federal courts have no binding effect on state courts
[Vol. 35:971
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1. McCreary Jurisdictions
In Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, the First Circuit followed the
Third Circuit's decision in McCreary.97 This case arose out of a
dispute over the termination of a distributorship contract between
a Puerto Rican company and its Italian supplier.98 When the Ital-
ian supplier failed to renew the distributorship contract, the Puerto
Rican company brought an action in the Superior Court of Puerto
Rico.99 The supplier successfully removed the action to federal
court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction 00 and filed a motion to
dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 101 Relying
on the contract's arbitration clause and the Third Circuit's holding
in McCreary, the district court found that article 11(3) of the Con-
vention mandates referral to arbitration and makes no provision
for a court to retain any degree of jurisdiction over the dispute. °2
Therefore, the court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.10 3 On appeal, the First Circuit upheld the decision of
the district court; in doing so, it cited McCreary as well as the
Fourth Circuit's holding in LT.A.D. Assoc. v. Podar Bros."4
The Ledee decisions bring the First Circuit into close alliance
with the Third Circuit's McCreary view. The district court specifi-
cally relied on McCreary for the proposition that after referring a
dispute to arbitration, a court may not retain jurisdiction over the
matter.105 The First Circuit upheld this decision and supported its
own opinion with additional references to McCreary and its prog-
that lie outside their appellate jurisdiction), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971); Note,
Authority in State Courts of Lower Federal Court Decisions on National Law, 48 Colum.
L. Rev. 943, 946-47 (1948)(same). One might be tempted to speculate that, in such a case,
diversity jurisdiction would, in the context of international arbitration, ensure the effective
predominance of the Second Circuit's view. The clever joinder of parties, however, often
serves to destroy diversity jurisdiction or to bar removal. See Bi v. Union Carbide, 984
F.2d 582,584 n2 (2d Cir. 1993) (providing a litany of methods by which a party can destroy
diversity and prevent removal of an action to federal court). Removal on the basis of
federal question jurisdiction would, thus, present a more promising way to maintain the
predominance of federal courts. However, because the federal question must appear on
the face of the plaintiff's complaint, this avenue may also be subject to manipulation.
97. Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1982).
98. Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 528 F. Supp. 243, 244 (D.P.R. 1981).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 245-46.
103. Id. at 246.
104. Ledee, 684 F.2d at 187 (citing I.T.A.D. Assoc. v. Podar Bros., 636 F.2d 75 (4th Cir.
1981)).
105. Ledee, 528 F. Supp. at 245-46.
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eny.1 6 Although Ledee did not specifically involve a request for a
pre-award attachment, it is difficult to see how a pre-award attach-
ment could be granted without violating the court's reasoning. If a
court retains no jurisdiction after sending the parties to arbitration,
it lacks the authority to order an attachment. Thus, although the
First Circuit has never held that pre-award attachments are
unavailable under the New York Convention, it would have to
overrule its decision in Ledee in order to reach a different result.
Fifteen years ago, the Fourth Circuit became the first federal
appellate court to announce its unqualified support for McCreary.
LT.A.D. Assoc. v. Podar Bros. involved a dispute between an
Indian seller and a U.S. buyer.10 7 After the Indian government
prevented the seller from fulfilling its obligations, the U.S. buyer
brought a suit for breach of contract and obtained an attachment in
a South Carolina state court.'08 The Indian seller removed the case
to federal court where it moved to compel arbitration. 0 9 The dis-
trict court denied the request. 1 0 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
reversed the district court and ordered the attachment liqui-
dated."' Citing only McCreary as authority, the court held tersely
that the attachment was obtained "contrary to the parties' agree-
ment to arbitrate and the Convention. 1" 2
The Eighth Circuit itself has only once had occasion to cite
McCreary. In that case, the court cited McCreary to support its
position on the appealability of transfer orders." 3 It yields no
insight germane to the present inquiry. However, McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Kingdom of Denmark, a 1985 decision of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri,
sheds more light on the availability of interim measures under the
106. Ledee, 684 F.2d at 187.
107. I.T.A.D. Assoc. v. Podar Bros., 636 F.2d 75, 76 (4th Cir. 1981).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 77.
112. Id. The Fourth Circuit has not deviated from its decision in LT.A.D. Assoc. In
1992, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland cited Carolina Power &
Light as precedent. Cameco Indus., Inc. v. Maytrac, S.A., 789 F. Supp. 200, 204 (D. Md.
1992). The court, however, cited Carolina Power & Light for the general proposition that a
quasi in rem attachment may in part be justified by the liquidity of the asset. Id. Because
the Maryland case dealt with the grounds for a pre-judgment attachment, id., it does not
lead one to believe that the Fourth Circuit's lower courts have launched an assault on
LT.A.D. Assoc.
113. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. American Family Life Assurance Co., 787 F.2d 438,
439 (8th Cir. 1986).
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New York Convention." 4 In that case, McDonnell Douglas
brought a declaratory action for the purpose of absolving itself
from any liability in the unintentional firing of a missile it had sold
to the Danish Navy." 5 Citing the sales contract's arbitration clause
and the Convention, the Danish Navy moved to dismiss the com-
plaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."16
The district court granted the Danish request. In a two-sentence
discussion of this crucial issue, the court noted that under section 3
of the FAA, it would usually stay litigation of any disputes subject
to an arbitration clause." 7 With regard to the Convention, the
court found persuasive the argument that it had no choice but to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction any claims falling
within the scope of a valid arbitration clause.118 In support of its
conclusion, the court cited both McCreary and, Ledee.119
Thus, the existing precedent indicates that interim measures may
not be available in the Eighth Circuit. If the district court found
itself unable to retain sufficient jurisdiction merely to stay the liti-
gation, it certainly had no power to grant provisional measures.
This conclusion is confirmed by the previous discussion of the
availability of interim measures under chapter 1 of the FAA.12
The Eighth Circuit considers it impossible simultaneously to order
arbitration and to weigh the parties' claims to provisional meas-
ures.12 ' Given this approach and the similarity between "order-
ing" 2 and "referring"'1 3 parties to arbitration, it is only logical
that the courts of the Eighth Circuit would refuse to grant pre-
award attachments in cases subject to the Convention.
Like the Eighth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit reports only one case
that mentions McCreary.'24 The court followed the Third Circuit's
view on the appealability of transfer orders.' -5 Thus, it is difficult
114. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Kingdom of Denmark, 607 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. Mo.
1985).
115. Id. at 1017.
116. Id. at 1020.
117. Id. (citing to 9 U.S.C. § 3).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See supra part I.A.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45 (discussing Merrill Lynch, Pierce. Fenner
& Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, 726 F.2d 1286, 1291-92 (8th Cir. 1984)).
122. Section 4 of the FAA requires courts to "order" parties to arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
123. Article II(3) of the Convention, supra note 8, requires courts to "refer" parties to
arbitration.
124. Jesko v. United States, 713 F.2d 565, 568 (10th Cir. 1983).
125. Id.
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to predict how the Tenth Circuit might rule on a request for interim
relief under the Convention. Yet, given its past hostility to interim
measures under section 4 orders to arbitrate,126 it would be prudent
to expect a similar reaction under an article 11(3) reference to
arbitration. 2 7
2. Carolina Power & Light Jurisdictions
The Fifth Circuit has hinted that it might be persuaded to reject
McCreary. In E.A.S.T., Inc. of Stamford, Conn. v. M/V ALAIA, a
U.S. company had agreed to charter a foreign vessel.' 28 The char-
ter party called for arbitration of any disputes in London under
English law.' 29 When the U.S. company received the vessel in
unseaworthy condition, it petitioned a district court to compel arbi-
tration and arrest the vessel under section 8 of the FAA.1 30 The
owners of the vessel argued, inter alia, that the court had no power
to arrest the vessel and compel arbitration on the basis of in rem
jurisdiction. 13 The district court rejected this argument, compelled
arbitration, arrested the vessel as security and retained jurisdiction
over the matter. 32
On appeal, the owners of the vessel claimed that the vessel had
been arrested in violation of the New York Convention. 133 The
Fifth Circuit upheld the district court, basing its opinion in part
upon an exception to the McCreary doctrine created in the Second
Circuit: that the Convention does allow pre-award attachments in
admiralty cases.13 4 At the same time, the court noted that the rea-
soning of McCreary-if valid to begin with-should apply to arbi-
trations involving questions of admiralty as well as to those
involving typical commercial disputes. 35 It also observed that a
number of courts and commentators had criticized McCreary.136
Therefore, although holding only that maritime attachments do not
126. See supra note 44.
127. This occurred in the Ninth Circuit. PMS Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Huber & Shuner,
A.G., 863 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1988); see infra text accompanying notes 145-46.
128. E.A.S.T., Inc. of Stamford, Conn. v. MN ALAIA, 876 F.2d 1168, 1169 (5th Cir.
1989).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1170.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1171 (claiming that "pre-arbitration attachment is inconsistent with the [New
York Convention]").
134. Id. at 1173.
135. Id. at 1173 n.3.
136. Id. at 1173.
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violate the Convention, the Fifth Circuit's dicta may solicit arbitrat-
ing parties to challenge McCreary.
One of the Sixth Circuit's district courts has concluded some-
what tentatively that interim measures are available under the
Convention. In Tennessee Imports, Inc. v. Filippi, a U.S. distribu-
tor brought a breach of contract suit against an Italian supplier and
sought a preliminary injunction.137 In response, the Italian supplier
argued that the distributorship contract required arbitration of all
disputes in Italy.138 The court noted that this forum selection
clause, in turn, triggered article 11(3) of the Convention, which
required the court to refer the parties to arbitration and perhaps
divest itself of subject matter jurisdiction.139 As authority for this
line of reasoning, the court cited McCreary.1'0
The court agreed that there is merit in the McCreary approach
and decided that, in general, courts ordering parties to arbitrate
pursuant to article 11(3) should subsequently dismiss any litigation
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.14' The court, however, also
found persuasive the line of cases holding that a court may merely
stay litigation under article 11(3) when necessary to order interim
measures in aid of arbitration; in fact, the court acknowledged that
interim measures are sometimes necessary to ensure that arbitra-
tion remains a meaningful process of dispute resolution.1 42 Ulti-
mately, the court decided that the plaintiff had failed to make a
compelling case for a preliminary injunction.143 Therefore, the
court declined to rule on whether or not interim measures are
available under the Convention.'" Nonetheless, its dicta can
hardly encourage proponents of McCreary.
The Ninth Circuit has never had occasion to adopt the full hold-
ing of the district court's opinion in Carolina Power & Light. In
PMS Distrib. Co. v. Huber & Shuner, A. G., it cited Carolina Power
& Light as authority for the proposition that, after ordering arbi-
tration pursuant to section 4 of the FAA, a court may retain juris-
diction sufficient to maintain an attachment.145 Because PMS
137. Tennessee Imports, Inc. v. Filippi, 745 F. Supp. 1314. 1317-18 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
138. Id. at 1318.
139. Id. at 1322-23, 1323 n.4.
140. Id. at 1323.
141. Id. at 1324.
142. Id. at 1325.
143. Id. at 1329-30.
144. Id. at 1329.
145. PMS Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Huber & Shuner, A.G., 863 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1988).
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Distrib. cites Carolina Power & Light as authority only for the
availability of pre-award attachments under chapter 1 of the FAA,
it does not directly confirm the full holding of Carolina Power &
Light. Yet, inasmuch as the power to grant provisional measures
after ordering arbitration pursuant to section 4 of the FAA was a
key argument in favor of reaching the same result when "referring"
parties to arbitration under the Convention, 146 it seems that the
Ninth Circuit looks favorably upon the holding of Carolina Power
& Light.
3. Mixed-Precedent Jurisdictions
Prior to 1990, courts within the Second Circuit typically held that
once arbitration is ordered pursuant to the Convention, courts are
stripped of subject matter jurisdiction over the matter.147 In Bor-
den, Inc. v. Meiji Milk Prods. Co., however, the Second Circuit
broke with precedent and upheld a district court's decision to grant
a preliminary injunction in aid of arbitration. 148 The Second Cir-
cuit could have relied on an earlier district court case which had
held that although there is some question regarding a court's
authority to order a pre-award attachment under the Convention,
it may issue an injunction. 149 Instead, the Second Circuit seemed
to distinguish Borden from McCreary, finding that the injunction,
in contrast to a pre-award attachment, is an aid to arbitration
rather than an effort to evade arbitration. 50
The Borden decision, although purporting only to distinguish
McCreary, effectively repudiates it in two ways. First, although an
in personam order may differ from an in rem order in the abstract,
their practical effects are identical-the owner of the assets loses
the power to move them at will.' 5' Second, and of more impor-
tance, lying at the core of McCreary is the premise that article 11(3)
divests courts of subject matter jurisdiction to do anything beyond
146. Carolina Power & Light, 451 F. Supp. at 1052.
147. See, e.g., Astor Chocolate Corp. v. Mikroverk, 704 F. Supp. 30,35 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
148. Borden, Inc. v. Meiji Milk Prods. Co., 919 F.2d 822, 825-26 (2d Cir. 1990).
149. Rogers, Burgun, Shahine & Deschler, Inc. v. Dongsan Constr. Co., 598 F. Supp.
754, 758, 759 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also infra text accompanying notes 195-98
(discussing Dongsan).
150. Borden, 919 F.2d at 825-26 (holding that the Convention does not strip courts of
their jurisdiction to issue a preliminary injunction, but noting the Third Circuit's holding in
McCreary that the Convention forbids courts from granting pre-award attachments).
151. See Shenton, supra note 2, at 103-04 (treating in personam Mareva injunctions, see
infra text accompanying notes 231-37, as the English equivalent of pre-award attachments).
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referring the parties to arbitration.'t 2 Thus, even if one believes
that injunctions differ fundamentally from attachments, the fact
remains that under McCreary a court lacks subject matter jurisdic-
tion and, thus, the authority to issue either in personam or in rem
orders for interim relief. Because the Borden decision found arti-
cle H1(3) to present no bar to pre-award injunctions, it amounted to
a rejection of the line of lower court cases following McCreary. In
1991, however, another panel of the same court placed Borden into
question by acknowledging, yet failing to confront, the key jurisdic-
tional issue.
In David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., the Sec-
ond Circuit held that there remained some controversy concerning
the authority to retain any jurisdiction over a dispute after refer-
ring it to arbitration under the Convention.5 3 The court noted the
existence of Borden as well as several district court decisions that
had followed McCreary.15 4 In light of the continuing debate, the
court refused to discuss the question until it had been developed
more clearly on remand. 55
Thus, the Second Circuit's stance on the availability of interim
measures under the Convention is, for now, uncertain. Until 1990,
parties understood that courts would not grant provisional meas-
ures. After Borden, parties would have been justified in expecting
courts to grant certain measures, such as injunctions, where appro-
priate. Unfortunately, the more recent dicta of the Threlkeld panel
leave parties to ponder the state of the law and their own exposure.
Does this confusion reflect an unintended hiccough or a bitter con-
troversy among the judges of the Second Circuit? If the latter is
152. McCreary, 501 F.2d at 1038:
Unlike § 3 of the federal Act, article 11(3) of the Convention provides that the
court of a contracting state shall "refer the parties to arbitration" rather than
"stay the trial of the action." The Convention forbids the courts of a contracting
state from entertaining a suit which violates an agreement to arbitrate. Thus, the
contention that arbitration is merely another method of trial, to which provisional
state remedies should equally apply, is unavailable.
See also David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245,253 n.2 (2d Cir.
1991) (construing McCreary as holding that "once arbitration is ordered pursuant to the
Convention, the court is stripped of subject matter jurisdiction"); Carolina Power & Light,
451 F. Supp. at 1051 (interpreting McCreary as holding that the Convention "completely
ousts the court of jurisdiction"; Cooper, 442 N.E.2d at 1242 (understanding McCreary as
holding that article HI(3) "precludes the courts from acting in any capacity except to order
arbitration").
153. Threlkeld, 923 F.2d at 253 n.2.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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true, does Borden apply only to injunctions? Does it apply at all?
Given the amount of assets subject to its jurisdiction, the Second
Circuit would serve businesses well by clarifying these points.
Like the Second Circuit, the Seventh Circuit's precedent leaves
ample room for parties to argue both for and against the availabil-
ity of interim measures under the Convention. Those favoring
interim measures might look to the court's decision in Sauer-
Getriebe KG v. White Hydraulics, Inc.156 The case arose as the
result of a dispute over an agreement in which a U.S. producer of
motors had granted a distributorship to a German firm.157 When
the German firm learned that the owner of the U.S. company
planned to sell its assets, it brought suit to enjoin the U.S. owner
from transferring the assets until after the parties had terminated
arbitration. 58 In what appears to have been a confused and simply
wrongly decided opinion, the district court denied the injunction,
enjoined the German firm from proceeding with the arbitration it
had already commenced and made findings which it declared to be
binding in any future arbitrations. 5 9 On appeal, the Seventh Cir-
cuit reversed the district court on each of these points.160
The outcome in Sauer-Getriebe KG would seem to lead to the
conclusion that attachments may be granted in aid of arbitration.
This conclusion, however, depends on two premises. First, it
assumes that if the Convention allows a court to order injunctions,
the same must be true of attachments. This is a reasonable
assumption, but it has been rejected by at least one district court in
the Second Circuit.' 6' Thus, although the Seventh Circuit's deci-
sion to grant an injunction logically leads to the same result for
attachments, some persuasive precedent points in the opposite
direction.
Second, and of greater importance, it assumes that the Seventh
Circuit decided Sauer-Getriebe KG under the Convention.
Because the situs of the arbitration was in the United Kingdom-a
signatory to the Convention-and the parties represented two dif-
156. Sauer-Getriebe KG v. White Hydraulics, Inc., 715 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1070 (1984).
157. Id. at 349.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 350.
161. See Rogers, Burgun, Shahine & Deschler, Inc. v. Dongsan Constr. Co., 598 F. Supp.
754, 759 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (deciding that a court may be unable to grant an attachment
under the Convention, but can order an injunction); see infra notes 195-99.
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ferent countries, the assumption is logical.162 In International Ship-
ping Co. v. Hydra Offshore, Inc., however, the Second Circuit
noted that a party cannot invoke the Convention unless it seeks
either to compel arbitration or to enforce an award. 163 Because the
plaintiff in Sauer-Getriebe KG attempted to do neither, his case
may not have arisen under the Convention.'6 Indeed, the Third
Circuit, 165 the Fifth Circuit' 66 and the Ninth Circuit,167 as well as
Supreme Court Justices White and Blackmun, 168 have all inter-
preted Sauer-Getriebe KG as arising under the domestic portion of
the FAA. The Sauer-Getriebe KG court's failure to mention the
Convention or any case interpreting it tends to confirm this theory.
Furthermore, an opinion that the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois handed down a year after
Sauer-Getriebe KG supports the position that Sauer-Getriebe KG
was not decided under the Convention. In Matrenord, S.A. v.
Zokor Int'l Ltd., the French plaintiff had filed for an attachment
against two U.S. companies that had defaulted on a loan.169 The
defendants moved to dismiss, claiming that the court lacked com-
petence to deal with the matter.170 After reciting the conclusions
reached by a number of other jurisdictions, the district court
declared the matter to be a question of first impression in the Sev-
enth Circuit. 71 This confirms the previous analysis of Sauer-
Getriebe KG as a case arising under chapter 1 of the FAA. There-
fore, contrary to the opinions of some commentators,'7 2 Saiter-
Getriebe KG sheds only questionable light on the Seventh Circuit's
interpretation of article 11(3).
162. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (noting that arbitration falls under the Convention if agreement is
not entirely between U.S. citizens).
163. International Shipping Co. v. Hydra Offshore, Inc., 875 F.2d 388,391 n.5 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1003 (1989).
164. In its lawsuit, the German company sought only an injunction until the parties'
rights had been determined by arbitration; it did not seek to compel arbitration. Sauer-
Getriebe KG, 715 F.2d at 348-49.
165. Ortho Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 882 F.2d 806, 811 (3d Cir. 1989).
166. RGI, Inc. v. Tucker & Assoc., 858 F.2d 227, 229 (5th Cir. 1988).
167. PMS Distrib. Co. v. Huber & Shuner, A.G., 863 F.2d 639, 641-42 (9th Cir. 1988).
168. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc. v. McCollum, 469 U.S. 1127, 1130
(1985) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
169. Matrenord, S.A. v. Zokor Int'l, Ltd., No. 84 Civ. 1639 (N.D. II1. Dec. 19, 1984)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., Zicherman, supra note 3, at 689 n.139.
1995]
996 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Because it went on to reject McCreary, Matrenord might provide
greater illumination on the Seventh Circuit's position. Three facts,
however, limit the decision's utility as precedent. First, it is a
twelve-year-old unpublished case which no other court has cited as
authority. Second, Matrenord seriously misinterprets McCreary
and, consequently, fails to address its central argument. For exam-
ple, in McCreary, the Third Circuit held that the words "refer the
parties to arbitration" strip courts of jurisdiction to order pre-
award attachments. 173 Although reaching different conclusions
about article 11(3), the courts in both Cooper and Carolina Power
& Light agreed that this was the central holding in McCreary.174 In
contrast, the court in Matrenord explained that the Third Circuit
considered the Convention to prohibit pre-award attachments
because such measures allow parties to bypass their agreement to
settle disputes through arbitration. 175 Because the Illinois court
disagreed with this statement as a matter of principle, it rejected
McCreary entirely. 76 Although the district court held that pre-
award attachments are available under the Convention, its misin-
terpretation of precedent and failure to address the key jurisdic-
tional question leave its decision open to challenge.
Finally, Matrenord stands at odds with a more recent, published
opinion of the Northern District of Illinois. In Marchetto v.
DeKalb Genetics Corp., an Italian company and a U.S. corporation
had created a joint venture, DeKalb Italiana. 77 Pursuant to the
joint venture agreement, neither party could sell its stock without
first offering it to the other partner.178 The parties also agreed to
submit all differences to arbitration in Italy. 79 When the U.S. com-
pany sold its shares to a third entity, the Italian company brought a
suit for breach of contract. 80 The U.S. corporation moved to dis-
miss the action because the arbitration clause provided for dispute
resolution in Italy.18' Because the court recognized the substantial
173. McCreary, 501 F.2d at 1038 ("Unlike § 3 of the federal Act, article 11(3) of the
Convention provides that the court of a contracting state shall 'refer the parties to
arbitration' rather than 'stay the ... action.' ") (emphasis added).
174. See Carolina Power & Light, 451 F. Supp. at 1051; Cooper, 442 N.E.2d at 1242.
175. Matrenord, S.A. v. Zokor Int'l, Ltd., No. 84 Civ. 1639 (N.D. Ii. Dec. 19, 1984)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
176. Id.
177. Marchetto v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 711 F. Supp. 936, 937 (N.D. III. 1989).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 938.
181. Id.
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presumption towards enforcing arbitration clauses under the Con-
vention, it effectively agreed that it was dispossessed of jurisdiction
over any suit subject to a valid arbitration clause. 1' The court
cited Ledee, McCreary and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Kingdom
of Denmark'83 in support of its decision to dismiss the Italian com-
pany's claims."
This opinion could be read as holding that, where interim meas-
ures are not an issue, a court must simply relieve itself of jurisdic-
tion upon finding that the dispute is subject to a valid arbitration
clause. Yet the DeKalb court's invocation of McCreary, Ledee and
McDonnell Douglas makes this argument difficult to maintain
because- each of these cases interpreted article 11(3) to deprive
courts of jurisdiction to do more than order parties to arbitration.
Therefore, one might argue that, were the issue directly before it,
the DeKalb court would have held itself incompetent to order
interim measures. Regardless of which theory the reader finds
more compelling, the point is that neither interpretation is beyond
question. Today, parties arbitrating under the Convention cannot
be sure whether the courts of the Seventh Circuit will offer them
recourse to pre-award attachments.
4. Summary
In sum, the circuits divide into an ambiguous three-way split: 1)
the First, Third, Fourth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits are either in or
leaning towards McCreary; 2) the Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits
either adhere or are sympathetic to Carolina Power & Light; and
3) the Second and Seventh Circuits have, arguably, articulated con-
flicting understandings of the law. The Eleventh and D.C. Circuits
present clean slates, not having considered the issue. Like the
Tenth Circuit, the Eleventh has followed McCreary, but only with
regards to the appealability of transfer orders.1' The existing
three-way split only increases unpredictability-and costs-to par-
ties who have turned to arbitration because of its certainty.
182. Id. at 938-39.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 114-19 (discussing McDonnell Douglas).
184. DeKalb, 711 F. Supp. at 940-41.
185. Alimenta (USA), Inc. v. Lyng, 872 F.2d 382,385 (11th Cir. 1989); Middlebrooks v.
Smith, 735 F.2d 431, 432 (11th Cir. 1984).
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B. Making Exceptions
The courts that hold themselves incompetent under the New
York Convention to order pre-award interim measures have
offered well-reasoned opinions in favor of their conclusion. So
have the courts rejecting this position. One means of assessing the
strength of each position is to examine the degree to which each
side of the debate has recognized exceptions to the general rule.
Other than advising courts to exercise caution in granting interim
relief,8 6 no court following the outcome of Carolina Power &
Light has recognized an exception to the general rule that provi-
sional measures theoretically are available under the Convention.
On the other hand, courts following the decision in McCreary have
recognized a number of exceptions to the general rule that provi-
sional measures are not available under the New York Convention.
As with the arguments advanced in McCreary, courts have
neglected to ground these exceptions in the Convention's travaux.
Indeed, their holdings often lack the virtue of logical consistency.
Consequently, they have done considerable harm both to doctrinal
stability and to the Convention's integrity. It is to these exceptions
that this Note now turns.
In 1977, the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York promulgated the "admiralty exception." In
Andros Compania Maratima, S.A. v. Andre & Cie., S.A, the court
granted the attachment of a vessel in aid of an arbitration that had
already commenced in London.' s7 As authority for its decision, the
court relied on section 8 of the FAA, which expressly provides for
pre-award attachment in arbitrations involving questions of admi-
ralty.18 8 The court noted that chapter 1 of the FAA applies insofar
as it does not conflict with the Convention.8 9 Reasoning that pre-
award attachment in maritime cases does not undermine the Con-
vention's main goal-the production of enforceable awards-the
court found the express terms of section 8 to control. 90 In so
186. See Tennessee Imports, Inc. v. Filippi, 745 F. Supp. 1314, 1324 (M.D. Tenn. 1990)
(holding that absent "compelling" reasons, dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
is appropriate).
187. Andros Compania Maratima, S.A. v. Andre & Cie, S.A., 430 F. Supp. 88, 89-90
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
188. Id. at 91.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 92-93.
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doing, it created an exception to McCreary that courts have con-
sistently applied when sitting in admiralty. 191
The Andros decision and its progeny may enjoy popularity with
those who would like to limit McCreary to the greatest extent pos-
sible. From a logical standpoint, however, the maritime exception
is indefensible. It is true that section 8 of the FAA expressly allows
pre-award attachment; however, chapter 1 of the FAA applies to
cases involving international arbitration only when consistent with
the Convention.192 Therefore, to grant interim measures based on
section 8, a court must first determine that the Convention presents
no obstacle to such an order. Because the Convention provides no
distinction between commercial and maritime arbitrations, it fol-
lows that the Convention either condones or prohibits both.1 93
Inasmuch as the Andros court agreed that McCreary governs com-
mercial arbitration clauses that fall under the Convention,191 it
should have explained why the Convention provides for a different
result in cases involving questions of admiralty. Understandably, it
chose not to undertake this seemingly impossible task.
Courts may have created the admiralty exception to cabin the
reach of ill-considered doctrine, but they would have served the
public better by rejecting McCreary as incompatible with the Con-
vention's travaux rather than by creating law out of whole cloth.
The point is not only that courts upset the separation of powers
when they assume the legislature's role, but also that, political the-
ory aside, lawyers give advice based on their understanding of stat-
utes and treaties. When courts begin to interpret written laws in an
unprincipled fashion, they reduce the utility of reasoned legal
advice and, thus, increase the cost of business transactions.
The Southern District of New York has also created an injunc-
tion exception.195 In Rogers, Burgun, Shahine & Deschler, Inc. v.
191. For sources listing cases, see Brower & Tbpman, supra note 13, at 28-29; McDonell,
supra note 15, at 286-87; Pew & Jarvis, supra note 82, at 33; Reichert, supra note 3, at 390;
Brody, supra note 14, at 114, 118-20.
192. 9 U.S.C. § 208.
193. Brower & Thpman, supra note 13, at 28-29; McDonell, supra note 15, at 286-87;
Pew & Jarvis, supra note 82, at 33; Reichert, supra note 3, at 390; Brody, supra note 14, at
114, 118-20.
194. Andros, 430 F. Supp. at 91 (noting that "this Court might easily enough extend the
instructions of McCreary . . . to support the conclusion that the 'libel-cum-seizure'
provisions of Section 8 are 'in conflict with' ... the Convention," but declining to do so).
195. Catherine Meier, Provisional Judicial Remedies in Arbitration: The United States
Position, in Interim Court Remedies in Support of Arbitration: A Country-by-Country
Analysis 31, 46 (David W. Shenton & Wolfgang Kuhn eds., 1987).
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Dongsan Constr. Co., the Southern District enjoined a Korean con-
tractor from drawing on a performance bond pending the outcome
of an International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration in
Paris. 96 In a footnote to its decision, the court acknowledged that
there is some question regarding the availability of pre-award
attachments under the Convention.197 It argued, however, that the
McCreary doctrine did not control because the case at bar dealt
with an injunction. 198
The distinction between attachments and injunctions is no more
justifiable than the line courts have drawn between admiralty and
non-admiralty cases. There simply is no operational difference
between the two. Only a lawyer could understand the distinction
between not being able to dispose of assets because of an order
against the assets as opposed to an order against their owner or
custodian. For business people, the effect of one is indistinguish-
able from the other. Indeed, even English legal commentators
treat such injunctions as equivalent to attachments, at least for
assets actually within the court's jurisdiction. 99
Despite the fact that the Dongsan exception can hardly be
defended from a legal point of view, it is not without merit. Were it
followed widely, the exception at least would swallow the rule.
Instead of applying for attachments, parties would simply request
injunctions. This would dispense with the need for further inexplic-
able deviations from McCreary and incursions upon the Conven-
tion's logical integrity. Yet, Dongsan has not enjoyed wide
acceptance; therefore, courts continue to craft new exceptions.
In two recent decisions, New York state courts have produced
yet another exception to McCreary. In both Goldenwave Marine
Ltd. v. H. Dantes Comercia, Navagacao e Industrias Ltd.2 and
Intermar Overseas, Inc. v. Argocean S.A.,°2 0 New York courts held
196. Rogers, Burgun, Shahine & Deschler, Inc. v. Dongsan Constr. Co., 598 F. Supp.
754, 758-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
197. Id. at 759 n.10.
198. Id. at 758, 759 & n.10.
199. D. W. Shenton, Attachments and Other Interim Court Remedies in Support of
Arbitration: The English Courts, in Interim Court Remedies in Support of Arbitration: A
Country-by-Country Analysis, supra note 195, at 53, 61; Shenton, supra note 2, at 103;
Zicherman, supra note 3, at 674.
200. Goldenwave Marine Ltd. v. H. Dantes Comercia, Navagacao e Industrias Ltd.,
Index No. 18488/89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. IAS Part 15, Jan. 23 1990), reprinted in Pew & Jarvis,
supra note 82, at 40.
201. Intermar Overseas, Inc. v. Argocean S.A., 117 A.D.2d 492, 497 (N.Y. App. Div.
1986).
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that citizens of states not party to the Convention cannot invoke it
for the purpose of liquidating attachments, even when the place of
arbitration is in a state that has ratified the Convention. These
decisions blatantly contradict the Convention. It is true that the
United States has a reciprocity reservation to the Convention;
however, this applies only to the enforcement of awards rendered
in a state not a party to the Convention.2°0 Because both suits dealt
with agreements to arbitrate in a country that has ratifled the Con-
vention, their holdings are simply wrong.2 3 Indeed, it contradicts
the Convention's one innovation regarding arbitral agreements.
The Geneva Protocol-the Convention's precursor with regard to
arbitration clauses-mandated enforcement only of agreements
between parties of different signatories. Writing shortly after
the Convention's drafting, several commentators hailed the exten-
sion of its coverage to all arbitral agreements as a significant
achievement.205 One can understand the courts' desire to prevent
a party from removing its assets to a country not party to the Con-
vention. Nevertheless, they would have served the public better
simply by refusing to follow McCreary rather than by rewriting the
Convention to achieve the desired resolution of individual cases.
The Second Circuit offers another solution for parties who wish
to obtain an attachment in a jurisdiction that follows McCreary.
Instead of torturing the Convention, this exception relies on its
express terms; however, it possesses almost no potential for practi-
cal application. In Sperry Int'l v. Government of Israel, the Second
Circuit confirmed a partial final award that enjoined Israel from
drawing on a $15 million letter of credit until after the tribunal
issued an award.20 6 Moreover, the same court had previously
refused to grant Sperry the injunction because it had not made any
showing of irreparable harm.20 7 Nonetheless, the court declined to
second-guess the arbitrators' conclusions and confirmed the
award.208
202. Convention, supra note 8, art. 1(3).
203. See id. art. II(1) (obligating contracting states to enforce all agreements to
arbitrate).
204. Geneva Protocol, supra note 17, art. 1; Contini, supra note 18, at 295-96; Samuel
Pisar, The United Nations Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards, 33 S. Cal. L Rev. 14,
15 (1959).
205. Contini, supra note 18, at 296; Pisar, supra note 204, at 15.
206. Sperry Int'l v. Government of Israel, 689 F.2d 301, 304 (2d Cir. 1982).
207. Id. at 303.
208. Id. at 306-07.
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Inexplicably, however, the court in Sperry did not discuss the
New York Convention. Therefore, one might argue that the court
did not decide Sperry under the Convention and that it might have
reached a different conclusion if it had. The argument is not
implausible. The Second Circuit disposed of Sperry fully one year
before it decided, in Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., that awards
rendered in the United States can be treated as foreign awards by
U.S. courts for purposes of the New York Convention.0 9 Yet, even
assuming that the Second Circuit decided Sperry as a case not fall-
ing under the Convention, it is difficult to envision a different
result for a factually similar case arising under the Convention. If
such an arbitration fell under the Convention, any final awards
issuing from it would be enforced under article 111.210 Therefore,
one cannot seriously maintain the argument that the possible inap-
plicability of the Convention had an effect on the outcome in
Sperry.
Consequently, parties desirous of securing pre-award attach-
ments should be able to do so in any jurisdiction by first obtaining
a partial final award from the arbitrators. Although this may pro-
vide parties with a way to avoid McCreary, it possesses little practi-
cal utility. In theory, parties petition courts for interim measures
when they fear imminent disposal of their adversary's assets. For
this reason, courts often hear petitions for attachment ex parte and
dispose of them in summary fashion.21' Demands for arbitration,
on the other hand, are never filed ex parte and hearings often com-
mence only months later.1 2 As a result, the "exception" promul-
gated in Sperry grants to defendants the opportunity to dissipate or
conceal assets and may leave plaintiffs with too little security too
late in the day.213
A final exception, which commentators have suggested but
which parties surprisingly have never tested in court, concerns the
situation in which parties provide for interim measures in their
arbitration clauses.2 4 No matter what the Convention says, our
courts must give effect to its implementing legislation.215 Section
209. Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932-33 (2d Cir. 1983).
210. Convention, supra note 8.
211. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 6211 (McKinney 1992); see also Reichert, supra note
3, at 372-73.
212. Brower & Tupman, supra note 13, at 24-25.
213. Id. at 25.
214. McDonell, supra note 15, at 291; Zicherman, supra note 3, at 684.
215. Restatement, supra note 96, § 111 cmt. h, § 115(1)(a); see also U.S. Const. art. VI,
§ 2 (placing statutes and treaties on the same footing and, thus, suggesting the controlling
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206 of the FAA, which implements article 11(3) of the Convention,
authorizes courts to direct parties to arbitration in accordance with
their agreement.216 Reading this provision literally, a court might
have no choice but to grant proper requests for pre-award attach-
ments in cases where the parties have provided for them.217 If suc-
cessful, this argument could moot the need for further debate
about whether the Convention itself prohibits pre-award attach-
ments. Two considerations, however, diminish the attractiveness of
section 206 as a solution to the controversy.
First, just as courts that dislike McCreary can employ domestic
law to limit the reach of the Convention's supposedly plain lan-
guage, so can advocates of McCreary choose to read U.S. law in
light of the Convention's plain language. This latter group might
rely on the maxim that, when possible, courts must construe
domestic law to conform to international obligations.218 Because
article 11(3), in their opinion, clearly prohibits recourse to provi-
sional measures and because section 206 of the FAA voices no
intent to derogate from the Convention, they could argue with
some force that the former provision cannot contradict the latter.
On a broader level, reliance on domestic law as a means of
avoiding judicial assertions about the meaning of article 11(3)
merely repeats a serious flaw in the attitude with which our courts
sometimes approach international obligations. When faced with
the Convention's vague language, the Third Circuit never inquired
into the collective will of the forty-five219 sovereign states that
drafted this international statute. Instead of consulting the Con-
vention's travaux, the circuit court simply pronounced one of its
possible meanings to be correct. Preferring a different outcome,
certain panels of the Second Circuit have carved exceptions into
the general rule. Their decisions likewise remain barren of argu-
ments grounded in the Convention's drafting history. Worse yet,
nature of subsequent implementing legislation, at least to the extent of any conflict with
the treaty).
216. 9 U.S.C. § 206.
217. Parties' failure to raise this point is somewhat puzzling, especially in Matrenord,
S.A. v. Zokor Int'l, Ltd., No. 84 Civ. 1639 (N.D. II1. Dec. 19,1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file), where the arbitration clause incorporated the ICC rules of arbitration. Article
8(5) of the ICC rules expressly authorizes parties to seek pre-award interim measures. Id.
at n.1.
218. Restatement, supra note 96, § 114.
219. Samuel Pisar, The United Nations Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1959 J.
Bus. L. 219,220 n.5; Allen Sultan, The United Nations Arbitration Convention and United
States Policy, 53 Am. . Int'l L. 807, 815 (1959).
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each exception that they approve relies upon a theory that is logi-
cally inconsistent with the Convention's drafting history or
language.
The failure of our judges to consult the Convention's travaux and
their Snark-like approach to its text2-0 suggests a shortfall of either
diligence or principled analysis. The presence of either quality
raises philosophical questions about our legal system. It also raises
intensely practical ones. When courts make unsupported asser-
tions about the Convention's meaning, the resulting spider web of
conflicting precedent and untenable exceptions increases the cost
of international transactions for U.S. business people.
Ex ante, the cost is simply the uncertainty of whether or not a
party can secure provisional measures in aid of future arbitrations.
Both parties to a transaction will discount the likelihood that they
will get what they want and will, therefore, charge more for their
end of the bargain. Once an arbitration has commenced, the costs
take the form of billable hours as the parties litigate whether or not
this case presents another suitable opportunity to cut an exception
out of whole cloth.
In a treaty designed to facilitate the settlement of disputes
involving international transactions, the presence of such an untidy
corner of doctrine is ironic. Irony, however, gives way to frustra-
tion when one understands that our courts could have avoided the
creation of this doctrine had they taken the opportunity to examine
and reflect upon the Convention's lineage and drafting history. In
so doing, they would have learned that its drafters never intended
to strip courts of jurisdiction to hear petitions for pre-award
attachments.
III. PEERING INTO THE TRA VA UX
The first step towards understanding why article 11(3) of the
Convention does not destroy judicial competence to grant pre-
award attachments lies in the approach of English courts to this
issue. In corntrast to their U.S. counterparts, English judges and
scholars have never doubted the power of courts to order such
measures.22' The second step towards enlightenment involves the
220. In The Hunting of the Snark, the Bellman informs his crew, "What I tell you three
times is true." Carroll, supra note 1, at 134; see supra note 1. This statement succinctly
captures the tendency of our courts to make rulings that contradict the Convention, defy
logic, or-at a minimum-lack the travaux's support.
221. See infra text accompanying notes 252-58.
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formulation of a theory to explain why U.S. courts have created a
doctrinal morass whereas the English courts have failed to encoun-
ter controversy. Although two U.S. commentators have formu-
lated an explanation for this phenomenon, their theory amounts to
little more than "English courts do not debate this point because it
is settled law."'2
The thesis of this section is that England's approach follows logi-
cally from its ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1923 22 and
participation in drafting the New York Convention.2 4 As a conse-
quence of these actions, England's courts understand that article
IV of the Geneva Protocol allowed them to retain jurisdiction over
parties after "referring" the merits of their dispute to arbitration.225
Because of England's efforts to draft article II(3) as a reenactment
of the Protocol's article IV, English courts have never conceived
that the Convention might deprive them of jurisdiction to order
interim measures. In contrast, the United States never became a
party to the Geneva Protocol.2 6 It also declined to play an active
role in drafting the New York Convention? 27 As a result, it pos-
sessed little understanding either of article IV of the Geneva Pro-
tocol or its republication in article H(3) of the Convention. This
ignorance, in turn, has provided a home for the doctrinal chaos that
surrounds the authority of U.S. courts to order pre-award attach-
ments under the Convention.
A. The English View
Section 12(6) of the English Arbitration Act of 1950 (1950 Act)
authorizes courts to assist international arbitrations by granting a
variety of interim measures to the same extent that those measures
222. Brower & 'Tpman, supra note 13, at 38 ("That English case law regarding court-
ordered provisional measures under the New York Convention is limited is not surprising.
English law recognizes that such measures are clearly compatible with arbitration
agreements, and hence with the New York Convention.").
223. See Geneva Protocol, supra note 17. The United Kingdom, whose representative
chaired the League of Nations' Subcommittee on Arbitral Clauses, also played an
important role in drafting the Protocol. See infra notes 259-75 and accompanying text.
224. The United Kingdom was a member of the Ad Hoc Committee appointed by the
United Nations to review a draft convention submitted by the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) and played a key role at the U.N. Drafting Conference. See infra text
accompanying notes 287, 296-97, 344-48.
225. See infra text accompanying notes 252-58.
226. See Pisar, supra note 219, at 219 n3 (listing parties to the Protocol); see also Sultan,
supra note 219, at 809 nn.22-23 (distinguishing between states that immediately ratified the
Protocol and states that later acceded to it).
227. See infra text accompanying notes 287, 298-99, 353-56.
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would be available in litigation.228 Until the mid-1970s, however,
English courts followed a nineteenth-century case, Lister & Co. v.
Stubbs,29 which held that a court normally could not enjoin the
dissipation or removal of assets until it had rendered judgment.230
In 1975, on the basis of questionable authority, an English court
granted a pre-judgment injunction in Nippon Yusen Kaisha v.
Karageorgis.23' That same year, another court followed suit in
Mareva Compania Naviera, S.A. v. International Bulkcarriers,
S.A.232 Despite the courts' dubious justification for departing from
precedent, their remedies enjoyed great popularity and were codi-
fied at section 37 of the Supreme Court Act of 1981.233
Today, the remedy is known as a "Mareva injunction. '' 23 Tech-
nically, it is not an attachment.235 It does not issue against an asset
per se but is an in personam order enjoining an owner or custodian
from removing or dissipating assets .3 6 Nonetheless, it has the
same operational effect as an attachment and has been treated as
the equivalent by commentators. 7
Following Karageorgis, pre-judgment interim measures became
available in England. Under section 12(6) of the 1950 Act, arbi-
trating parties could also obtain pre-award injunctive relief. That
is, of course, if section 12(6) survived English accession to the New
York Convention in 1975. The parties to a 1978 case, The Rena K,
presented the English courts with the first recorded opportunity to
decide what effect English ratification of the Convention had upon
section 12(6) of the 1950 Act.238
In The Rena K, the plaintiff consigned his sugar cargo to the
defendant's vessel.239 When the vessel arrived without all of its
228. Arbitration Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, ch. 27, § 12(6) (Eng.), reprinted in 2 Halsbury's
Statutes 571, 586 (4th ed. 1992).
229. Lister & Co. v. Stubbs, 45 Ch. D. 1 (C.A. 1890).
230. Shenton, supra note 199, at 60; Shenton, supra note 2, at 104; Zicherman, supra
note 3, at 669. If the plaintiff claimed a proprietary right to the asset in question, however,
the court could intervene. Shenton, supra note 199, at 60.
231. Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Karageorgis, [1975] 1 W.L.R 1093 (C.A.); Shenton, supra
note 199, at 60; Shenton, supra note 2, at 103-04.
232. Mareva Compania Naviera, S.A. v. International Bulkcarriers, S.A., [1980] 1 All
E.R. 213 (C.A. 1975).
233. Shenton, supra note 199, at 60; Shenton, supra note 2, at 103-04.
234. Shenton, supra note 2, at 103.
235. Id. at 104; Zicherman, supra note 3, at 674.
236. Shenton, supra note 2, at 104; Zicherman, supra note 3, at 674-75.
237. Sheaton, supra note 2, at 103; Zicherman, supra note 3, at 674-75.
238. The Rena K, 1979 Q.B. 377, 407 (1978).
239. Id. at 380.
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sugar, having jettisoned most of it because it spoiled en route, the
plaintiff brought suit against the defendant and sought to prevent
him from removing his vessel.240 The shipowner moved for a stay
of litigation pending arbitration as required by the bill of lading.241
He also argued that an injunction was not warranted.242 He did
not, however, suggest that the court lacked the power to order one.
Having considered these arguments, the court granted the stay of
litigation.24 3 In light of the defendant's financial condition, how-
ever, the court determined that the defendant was not entitled to
have his vessel released.244 In arriving at its decision, the court
noted that nothing in the laws governing arbitration requires a
court to release secured assets after granting a stay of litigation.2 45
It then turned to section 12(6) of the 1950 Act as authority for
granting the injunction.246
The Rena K has become accepted law in England.247 The author
of the opinion maintained that other courts had already reached
the same result in unreported cases.2m The case may thus be
viewed as confirmation of a trend in the law that had already
developed. In any event, several English courts, including the
House of Lords, have recognized the authority of courts to exercise
jurisdiction in support of arbitration.249
The failure of The Rena K court to find any prohibition on the
exercise of limited jurisdiction over arbitrating parties is consistent
with section 1(1) of the Arbitration Act of 1975, which implements
article 11(3) of the Convention 250 This provision authorizes parties
to an arbitration clause to request a stay of litigation and directs
courts to grant the stay 51 Because the authors of the implement-
240. Id. at 380, 385-86.
241. Id. at 386-89.
242. Id. at 409.
243. Id. at 391-95.
244. Id. at 406.
245. Id. at 404 (referring to the Arbitration Act of 1975, see infra text accompanying
note 250, which implemented article 1(3) of the New York Convention).
246. Id. at 407.
247. See The Bazias 3, [1993] 2 W.L.R. 854, 859 (C.A.); The Tuyuti. 1984 Q.B. 838. 850
(C.A.); Gidrxslme Shipping Co. v. Tantomar-Transportes Maritimos Lda., [1994] 4 All E.R.
507, 513 (Q.B.); see also Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. v. Balfour Beatty Constr. Ltd.. 1993
App. Cas. 334, 335-36, 351-52 (appeal taken from Eng.) (failing to cite The Rena K, but
holding that pre-award injunctions are available under the Convention).
248. The Rena K, 1979 Q.B. at 407.
249. See supra note 247 (listing cases).
250. The Rena K, 1979 Q.B. at 392-93.
251. Arbitration Act, 1975, ch. 3 § 1(1) (Eng.), reprinted in 2 Halsbury's Statutes 644
(4th ed. 1992).
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ing legislation chose to interpret "refer" to mean "stay," English
judges have no room to argue that the Convention precludes them
from exercising limited jurisdiction over a matter they have sent to
arbitration.
Someone unfamiliar with the history of the Geneva Protocol and
the New York Convention's travaux might wonder how the draft-
ers of the English implementing legislation arrived at this construc-
tion of "refer." English cases and scholarly writings yield no
answer to this puzzle. Judges have taken the statute at face
value.'-' Litigating parties have not urged them to do otherwise.
Two notable English arbitration treatises say nothing regarding the
subject.253 Another well-known English commentator similarly
failed to raise the matter in a piece analyzing the implementing
statute.254
As befuddling as this may appear, the explanation is surprisingly
simple. English authorities remain silent on the issue because it
presents no controversy. It does not provide cause for debate
because England played a pivotal role in incorporating article IV
of the 1923 Protocol into article 11(3) of the New York Conven-
tion.255 Because England was one of the Protocol's signatories, 256
it understood that its drafters had intended "refer" to mean
"stay."'' Therefore, the statute implementing the Protocol had
directed judges to "stay" litigation of disputes subject to arbitration
clauses.' 58 Consequently, it comes as no surprise that, in imple-
menting a republication of article IV of the Protocol, the drafters
also reenacted without question the language of its implementing
statute. To demonstrate the efficacy of this theory, we now turn to
252. See Channel Tunnel Group, 1993 App. Cas. at 351-52; The Bazias 3, 2 W.L.R. at
858; The Rena K, 1979 Q.B. at 393.
253. Sir Michael J. Mustill & Stewart C. Boyd, The Law and Practice of Commercial
Arbitration in England (2d ed. 1989); Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter, Law and Practice
of International Commercial Arbitration (2d ed. 1991).
254. Julian D.M. Lew, The Arbitration Act of 1975, 24 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 870 (1975).
255. See infra text accompanying notes 287, 296-97, 344-48.
256. See supra note 17.
257. See infra text accompanying notes 261-64, 344-48.
258. See The Arbitration Clauses (Protocol) Act, 1924, 14 & 15 Geo. 5, ch. 39, § 1(1)
(Eng.), reprinted in 1 Halsbury's Statutes 469, 470 (1929), which provided that:
[I]f any party to a submission ...to which the said protocol applies ...
commences any legal proceedings in any court against any other party to the
submission ... any party to such legal proceedings may... apply to that court to
stay the proceedings, and that court . . . shall make an order staying the
proceedings.
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the drafting history of the Geneva Protocol and the New York
Convention.
B. A Voice From the Attic: The Convention's Lineage and
Travaux
In 1922, the Economic Committee of the League of Nations con-
ducted an examination of national laws pertaining to the validity of
arbitral clauses.259 To facilitate its efforts, the Economic Commit-
tee appointed a Sub-Committee of legal experts (Sub-Committee
of Experts or Sub-Committee),m the chair of which was an Eng-
lish judge.2 1 The latter group met for two days in July, 1922.2
After brief deliberation, the experts concluded that the League
should sponsor a treaty that would require its adherents to enforce
arbitral agreements.263 In relevant part, paragraph 16 of their
report suggested that "[i]f two parties... agree to refer [to arbitra-
tion] disputes that may arise between them.., an action brought
by either party ... ought to be stayed by the court."2" Thus, it
seems the Sub-Committee envisioned that courts could both refer
the merits of a dispute to arbitration and still exercise limited juris-
diction over the parties.
Subsequently, the Economic Committee "fully endorse[d] the
views of the Sub-Committee of Experts"' ' 5 and, on September 16,
1922, submitted a resolution to the Council of the League to the
effect "[t]hat the conclusions arrived at by the Committee of
259. See, e.g., 3 League of Nations OJ. 1394-95, 1403-05, 1410-14 (1922) [hereinafter 3
League]; 4 League of Nations OJ. 835 (1923) [hereinafter 4 League] (explaining the
chronology of the League's work on arbitral agreements by the Economic Committee, the
Sub-Committee of Experts, and finally the Council of the League in a memorandum by the
Secretary-General); League of Nations OJ. Spec. Supp. 13, at 241-42 (1923) [hereinafter
League Spec. Supp. 13].
260. 3 League, supra note 259, at 1404; 4 League, supra note 259, at 835.
261. F.D. MacKinnon chaired the Sub-Committee. See 3 League, supra note 259, at
1404, 1414.
262. Id.
263. See id. at 1414; see also 4 League, supra note 259, at 835-36 (explaining that after
the Council of the League passed a resolution approving the Sub-Committee of Experts'
findings, the Economic Committee drafted a protocol on the enforcement of arbitral
agreements).
264. 3 League, supra note 259, at 1413 (emphasis added).
265. Id. at 1404; see 4 League, supra note 259, at 835 ("The Economic Committee fully
endorsed the views of the experts and especially their recommendation that the State
Members of the League should remove any obstacles in their laws which hinder the
recognition of [arbitral agreements] .... ").
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Experts (especially in Paragraph 16 of the report) be endorsed. 2 66
The Council of the League adopted the proposed resolution and
promised to introduce measures to enact the aims of paragraph
16.267 As a result, the Economic Committee, in consultation with
its legal experts, composed a draft protocol, article IV of which
provided that:
Tribunals of the Contracting Parties which, on being
seized of a dispute regarding a contract between persons
to whom Article I applies, recognise the existence in the
contract of an arbitration agreement, whether referring to
present or future differences, which is valid and capable
of being put into force, shall, on the application of any of
the parties, refer such parties to the decision of the
arbitrators.268
Although article IV does not specifically mention the court's
power to stay, the intent of the Economic Committee seems to
have been to adopt the principle behind paragraph 16 of the expert
report. For example, when transmitting the draft protocol to mem-
ber states, the Secretary-General specifically cited paragraph 16 of
the experts' report, which suggested that courts stay actions that
are subject to arbitral clauses.269 The Secretary-General's memo-
randum further noted that the Economic Committee and the
Council of the League fully approved of the proposals made in par-
agraph 16.270 Finally, the Secretary-General also informed mem-
bers of the League that "the Economic Committee... drew up the
.. draft protocol with the object of giving effect to the recommen-
dations contained in the report of the Sub-Committee. 2 7 1
In summary, a single thread runs through each step of the
Geneva Protocol's drafting history-endorsement of paragraph 16
of the Sub-Committee of Experts' report, which directs courts to
stay an action on the merits, but says nothing about relinquishing
266. 3 League, supra note 259, at 1405 (emphasis added); see also 4 League, supra note
259, at 835 (discussing the chronology of the League's work on arbitral agreements).
267. 3 League, supra note 259, at 1189, 1191 (reporting the Council's acceptance of
several resolutions made by the Economic Committee, including its reports on arbitration,
id., Annex 421 at 1392-95); 4 League, supra note 259, at 835.
268. 4 League, supra note 259, at 836 (emphasis added). Although the final language of
article IV differs slightly from this draft, the highlighted language remained the same. See
Geneva Protocol, supra note 17, art. IV. In addition, the drafters considered the
amendments not to be substantive. See League Spec. Supp. 13, supra note 259, at 73, 339.
269. See 4 League, supra note 259, at 835.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 836.
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jurisdiction over the parties.2 2 Therefore, the instruction of article
IV to "refer the parties .. , to the decision of the arbitrators"r
could only be understood as preventing courts from deciding the
merits of a dispute. It does not prohibit them from retaining lim-
ited jurisdiction over the parties. Subsequent English legislation
supports the above proposition. England, whose representative
chaired the Sub-Committee of Experts, implemented the Protocol
through a statute that required only a stay of litigation.2 74 Like-
wise, several scholars of that era described article IV of the Proto-
col as requiring courts to "stay" litigation and "refer" parties to
arbitration.2 75
Although the Protocol made great strides towards the interna-
tional recognition of arbitral agreements, it did little to facilitate
international enforcement of awards. The Sub-Committee
believed that the time was not yet ripe for such an ambitious
step.276 Therefore, the Protocol required only that its adherents
enforce awards rendered on their own territory.2 "7
Left unregulated, the enforcement of awards quickly ripened as
an issue. Consequently, four years later, the League of Nations
sponsored the Geneva Convention of 1927 (Geneva Convention),
which required its signatories to honor awards rendered on the ter-
ritory of any other party.278 Unfortunately, this seemingly broad
obligation attached only after the enforcing party proved that the
arbitration'had proceeded in strict accordance with the laws of the
arbitral situs.279 In practice, this meant that the successful party
had to confirm the award in the courts of the arbitral situs before
attempting to enforce the award abroad.280
272. See 3 League, supra note 259, at 1412-13 (although noting that some countries
stayed or dismissed pursuant to arbitral agreements, the Sub-Committee endorsed only a
stay in paragraph 16 of its report).
273. Geneva Protocol, supra note 17, art. IV (emphasis added).
274. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
275. See Earnest G. Lorenzen, Commercial Arbitration, 45 Yale U. 39. 63 (1935):
Arthur Nussbaum, Treaties on Commercial Arbitration-A Test of International Private-
Law Legislation. 56 Harv. L. Rev. 219,221 (1942); Pisar, supra note 204, at 15: Pisar. supra
note 219, at 220.
276. See 3 League, supra note 259, at 1413-14 ("In our opinion the time is not yet come
at which this question of the reciprocal enforcement of awards in different countries can be
considered with profit.").
277. Geneva Protocol, supra note 17, art. III.
278. Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Sept. 26, 1927,
92 L.N.T.S. 301, art. I [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
279. Id.; see Redfern & Hunter, supra note 253, at 62; Contini, supra note 18, at 288-90;
Lorenzen, supra note 275, at 64-65; Quigley, supra note 18, at 1054.
280. See Redfern & Hunter, supra note 253, at 62.
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Although the drafters of the Geneva Convention strove to
address the issue that the Protocol's drafters had left unresolved,
they made no attempt to amend the older document. Viewing the
instruments as mutually supportive, they extended membership
only to those states that had already ratified the Protocol.28 1 Thus,
it follows logically that even advocates of an improved regime for
recognizing awards found no need to tamper with the existing sys-
tem for enforcing agreements to arbitrate.
In 1953, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
examined deficiencies in the existing system of international arbi-
tration and proposed that the U.N. Social and Economic Council
sponsor a convention on arbitral awards to replace the Geneva
Convention.282 The ICC had one main complaint regarding the sta-
tus quo: the burden under the Geneva Convention of proving to
the courts of the arbitral situs that the arbitration had been con-
ducted in strict accordance with local procedure.283 Indeed, apart
from dropping this provision, the ICC's proposed convention did
not differ greatly from the Geneva Convention with regard to
enforcement of awards.8 4 In relation to arbitral agreements, how-
ever, the ICC draft appears to have made an unintentional depar-
ture from the Geneva Convention. Although the ICC expressed
no objection to the Geneva Protocol's regime for enforcing arbitra-
tion clauses, its draft failed to include the requirement of the
Geneva Convention that signature be open only to the Protocol's
adherents. 5
Two years later, in 1955, the Economic and Social Council
responded to the ICC's concerns by establishing an Ad Hoc Com-
mittee to study the enforcement of arbitral awards.286 With experts
representing Australia, Belgium, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Sweden,
the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, the committee met
from March 1 to March 15, 1955.87
281. Geneva Convention, supra note 278, art. VII; see also Pisar, supra note 204, at 15.
282. United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Enforcement of International
Arbitral Awards at 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.2/373 (1953); see also Contini, supra note 18, at 290-
91 (providing a brief historical sketch of the ICC's report and the subsequent action taken
by the Economic and Social Council to study arbitral agreements).
283. U.N. Doc. E/C.2/373, supra note 282, at 7.
284. Contini, supra note 18, at 290.
285. See U.N. Doe. E/C.2/373, supra note 282, at 7.
286. See United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Report of the Committee on
the Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards at 1, U.N. Doc. E/2704, E/AC.42/4/Rev.
1 (1955).
287. Id. at 1-2.
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During one of these sessions, the Swedish delegation proposed
that the new convention's first article should reproduce article I of
the Geneva Protocol, explicitly requiring adherents to recognize
the validity of arbitration agreements -m This, Sweden argued,
would prevent parties from sabotaging the new convention by
refusing to uphold arbitral clauses 9 Although India and the
United Kingdom considered such a provision necessary to secure
the aims of the convention,290 four members voted against it.
Ecuador believed the validity of arbitral clauses to be implicit in a
convention on the enforcement of awards; Egypt thought that an
article on agreements transgressed the committee's mandate to
draft a treaty on the recognition of final awards; Belgium voted
against the proposal because it was "imprecise and superfluous;"
the Soviet Union merely declared the suggestion to be unaccept-
able. 91 Having rejected Sweden's proposal, the committee submit-
ted a text that addressed only the enforcement of final awards2'
and transmitted its report to the Economic and Social Council on
March 28, 1955.293
On May 20, 1955, the Economic and Social Council requested
that the Secretary-General transmit the Ad Hoc Committee's draft
to U.N. members for their comments 294 In response, Sweden reit-
erated its concern that, unless the new convention either incorpo-
rated or reproduced the language of the Geneva Protocol, parties
to arbitral clauses might sabotage the new convention's object by
declaring their agreements invalid and bringing their disputes
before courts.2 95
In its own comments, the United Kingdom also noted that the
draft made no reference to the Geneva Protocol, which it called
288. Id. at 6.
289. See id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, Comments by Governments on the Draft Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Sweden) at 13, U.N. Doc. E/
2822/Add.l/Annex I (1956); id. (United Kingdom), U.N. Doc. E/2822!Add.4lAnnex I. at 3;
U.N. Doc. EICONF.26t2, supra note 65, at 13.
293. U.N. Doc. E/2704, supra note 286, at 1.
294. United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards; Report by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. E/2822, para. 1
(1956); Reichert, supra note 3, at 380 (citing E.S.C. Res. 570, U.N. ESCOR, 19th Sess.
(resumed), Supp. No. 1A, at 3, U.N. Doc. E/2730/Add.1 (1955)).
295. U.N. Doc. El2822/Add.l/Annex I, supra note 292, at 1.
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the "necessary substratum" of the Geneva Convention of 1927.96
Although the British government had not yet formulated a final
position on the matter, it acknowledged the gravity of Sweden's
concern that the draft would remain incomplete without some link
to the Geneva Protocol.297
In contrast, the United States offered no comments on the
draft.298 Instead, it announced that it expected not to attend any
drafting conference that the United Nations might convene to fin-
ish the work undertaken by the Ad Hoc Committee. 99 This
notwithstanding, the Economic and Social Council noted the
draft's generally favorable reception and called for an international
conference on the matter. 0
The United Nations Conference on International Commercial
Arbitration (Conference) met in New York from May 20 to June
10, 1958.301 As might have been anticipated, the third day of the
Conference found Sweden submitting a proposal to amend the
draft treaty to include an article that would reenact the substance
of article I of the Geneva Protocol.302 The next day, at the Confer-
ence's seventh meeting, Sweden turned the discussion to its draft
article.30 3 Ceylon, France, Italy and Norway announced their sup-
port for the amendment °4 El Salvador and Turkey, on the other
hand, suggested that an article on the validity of arbitral agree-
ments did not belong in the body of a treaty dedicated to the
enforcement of awards. 30 5 Responding to their concern, India's
representative acknowledged that the Swedish text had failed to
gain the endorsement of the Ad Hoc Committee.30 6 He noted,
296. U.N. Doc. E/2822/Add.4/Annex I, supra note 292, at 3, 9.
297. Id. at 9.
298. U.N. Doe. E/2822, supra note 294, para. 6.
299. Id.
300. Contini, supra note 18, at 291.
301. Id.
302. United Nations, Economic and Social Council, United Nations Conference on
International Commercial Arbitration, Consideration of the Draft Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Item 4 of the Agenda),
Sweden: Amendment to the Draft Convention, U.N. Doe. E/CONF.26/L.8 (1958).
Surprisingly, Sweden allowed Poland to beat it to the punch. Poland submitted its own
draft amendment on the second day of the Conference. See id., Amendments to Draft
Convention Submitted by the Polish Delegation, U.N. Doe. E/CONF.26/L.7 (1958).
303. United Nations, Economic and Social Council, United Nations Conference on
International Commercial Arbitration, Summary Record (7th mtg.) at 8, U.N. Doc. E/
CONF.26/SR.7 (1958).
304. Id. at 9-11.
305. Id. at 10, 11.
306. Id. at 12.
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however, that the committee's objections were "devoid of sub-
stance," and in any event decisions of the committee could not
bind a conference of plenipotentiaries.0 7 Because of his view that
the validity of arbitral agreements and the enforcement of awards
were "all but inseparable," he supported Sweden's proposal. 3
With that, the meeting adjourned and the matter remained
unresolved.309
At its ninth meeting, the Conference resumed discussion of the
Geneva Protocol. This time, Poland urged the Conference to
adopt an article that it had drafted to deal with the matter.310 Like
Sweden, Poland hoped to prevent parties from evading enforce-
ment of awards by attacking the validity of arbitral clauses. 31'
Poland, however, touted its draft as more completely reproducing
the text of the Geneva Protocol. 312 Ceylon, Norway and the Soviet
Union voiced their support for the Swedish and Polish articles.313
Displaying a change of heart, Turkey declared the inclusion of such
a provision to be "essential to the proper completion of the Con-
ference's task. 314
Turkey, however, was not alone in its decision to switch sides in
the debate. India retreated from its endorsement of the Swedish
text.315 What it had called an "inseparable" issue, it now termed
"superfluous. 316 France also retracted its approval. 1 7 After due
reflection, its representative stated that "the essential point was
that by adopting such provisions, the plenipotentiaries would be
going beyond the scope of the draft convention and would thus be
misinterpreting the instructions ... and powers which they had
received from their Governments. ' 31 8 Belgium, Columbia, El Sal-
vador, Guatemala, West Germany and Yugoslavia agreed that
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. United Nations, Economic and Social Council. United Nations Conference on
International Commercial Arbitration, Summary Record (9th mtg.) at 2-3. U.N. Doc. E/
CONF.261SR.9 (1958).
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 6, 11.
314. Id. at 10.
315. Id. at 6.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 7-8.
318. Id.
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France had correctly perceived the main obstacle to the adoption
of such a revision.319
In an attempt to forge a compromise, the Swiss and 'Turkish dele-
gates asserted their belief that the Conference possessed the com-
petence to formulate a provision regarding the validity of arbitral
awards but suggested that its text be the subject of an annexed pro-
tocol.320 After the Belgian representative called for a vote on the
Conference's competence to address the issue, the Conference
decided by twenty-five votes to nine (with six abstentions) that it
had sufficient authority to address the matter.321 By twenty-five
votes to eight (with six abstentions), it then resolved to develop a
provision concerning the validity of arbitral agreements.3  Follow-
ing the advice of Switzerland, however, it decided to draft the pro-
vision as an annex to the convention rather than inserting it in the
convention's text.323 To this end, the Conference appointed a
working group consisting of Belgium, Poland, Sweden, Tirkey, the
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and West Germany.3 4
Sweden quickly turned this partial defeat to its advantage. Two
days later, it submitted to the working group a three-article proto-
col that reproduced the entire substance of the Geneva Protocol's
provisions on the validity of arbitral awards.325 Article I of the
draft restated Protocol article I, in which contracting parties under-
took to recognize the validity of arbitral agreements.326 Article II
of the draft reiterated the substance of Protocol article II, which
provided that the arbitral procedure would "be governed by the
will of the parties and subject to the ... law of the ... [arbitral
319. Id. at 3-7, 9-10, 13.
320. Id. at 10-11.
321. Id. at 12.
322. Id. at 13.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 14.
325. Compare United Nations, Economic and Social Council, United Nations
Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, Additional Protocol on Arbitration
Agreements, Sweden: Draft Submitted or Consideration by Working Party I1, U.N. Doc.
E/CONF.26/C.3/L.1 (1958) with Geneva Protocol, supra note 17, art. I. The reader will
recall that previously Sweden had merely suggested that the Convention reproduce article
I of the Geneva Protocol, which contains a general undertaking to recognize the validity of
arbitration clauses. See supra text accompanying notes 288, 302.
326. Compare U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/C.3/L.1, supra note 325, art. I, with Geneva
Protocol, supra note 17, art. I.
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situs]. '' 327 Fially, article IH of the draft reproduced Protocol arti-
cle IV almost verbatim:
The courts of any Contracting States to which the pres-
ent Protocol applies, on being seized of a dispute regard-
ing a contract containing an arbitration agreement which
is valid by virtue of article I and capable of being carried
into effect, shall refer the parties on the application of
either of them to the decision of the arbitratorsY s
After making several cosmetic changes,32 9 the working party
adopted this text from the Swedish draft and submitted it to the
full Conference.330 When discussion of the draft protocol began on
June 5, the Dutch delegate praised the working party's draft and
suggested that the Conference reconsider its decision not to
include it in the body of the Convention, particularly because the
goal of the plenipotentiaries was "to adopt a single instrument."'
The Dutch representative further proposed that the Conference
review a new draft article prepared by his delegation.33 ' This arti-
cle, which became article II of the Convention, condensed the sub-
327. Compare U.N. Doc. EICONF.261C.31L.1, supra note 325, art. H with Geneva
Protocol, supra note 17, art. II.
328. Compare U.N. Doc. EICONF.261C.3/L1, supra note 325, art. ll (reproduced in
pertinent part in text) with Geneva Protocol, supra note 17, art. IV (reproduced in
pertinent part below):
The tribunals of the Contracting Parties, on being seized of a dispute regarding
a contract made between persons to whom Article I applies and including an
Arbitration Agreement whether referring to present or future differences which
is valid in virtue of the said article and capable of being carried into effect, shall
refer the parties on the application of either of them to the decision of the
arbitrators.
329. For example, like article IV of the Geneva Protocol, article III of the Swedish draft
directed courts to "refer the parties ... to the decision of the arbitrators." U.N. Doe. El
CONF.26/C.3/L.1, supra note 325, art. 111. Article III of the working party's final version
directed them to "refer the parties . . . to arbitrators for decision." United Nations,
Economic and Social Council, Text of Additional Protocol on the Validity of Arbitration
Agreements Submitted by Working Party No. 2, art. I, U.N. Doc. E/CONF26/L.52
(1958). Substantively identical, both renditions of article II appear to require judges to
surrender only the power to impose a final resolution of the dispute at hand.
330. See U.N. Doc. EJCONF.261L.52, supra note 329.
331. United Nations, Economic and Social Council, United Nations Conference on
International Commercial Arbitration, Summary Record (21st mtg.) at 17, U.N. Doe. E/
CONF.261SR21 (1958). See generally Haight, supra note 18, at 24 (summarizing the U.N.
records of the meetings of the United Nations Conference on International Commercial
Arbitration).
332. U.N. Doc. EICONF.26/SR.21, supra note 331, at 17.
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stance of the draft protocol's three articles into three paragraphs. 333
Thus, an economy of language was required. Consequently, para-
graph three of the Dutch text reduced the Swedish draft's "refer
the parties.., to arbitrators for decision" 3 4 to "refer the parties to
arbitrators. ' 335 Of significance, it appears this revision sprang from
the need to simplify the language of the draft protocol, not from a
desire to modify its substance.336 After minimal discussion, the
Conference passed the Dutch motion by eighteen votes to eight
(with four abstentions).337
On the Conference's last working day, Belgium reasserted its
view that the Conference had exceeded its mandate in adopting
what had by now become article II, a provision on the validity of
arbitral agreements.338 Guatemala joined Belgium in its last-min-
ute attempt to derail article 11. 339 The debate reached a climax
when the Argentinean delegate, who had chaired the Conference's
Drafting Committee,310 agreed that the plenipotentiaries might
drop article II from the Convention.34' The Conference, he rea-
soned, had initially voted by a large majority not to include such a
provision.2 The Conference's decision to reverse itself on this
point had passed by a much narrower margin. 3
With a perfect sense of timing, the United Kingdom's represen-
tative stepped into the fray, arguing that clarification of the propo-
sal was essential to avoid a misunderstanding.344 He urged that
333. Compare U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/c.3/L.1, supra note 325 with United Nations,
Economic and Social Council, Netherlands: Amendment to Proposal Made by Working
Party No. 2, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/L.54 (1958).
334. U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/L.52, supra note 329, art. III.
335. U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/L.54, supra note 333, para. 3. The final version of article
11(3), adopted well into the evening of the Conference's last working day, changed this
portion of the text to "refer the parties to arbitration." See Convention, supra note 8, art.
11(3); United Nations, Economic and Social Council, United Nations Conference on
International Commercial Arbitration, Summary Record (23rd mtg.) at 13, U.N. Doc. E/
CONF.26/SR.23 (1958); see also Holmes, supra note 15, at 790-91 (stating that article II
"was hastily prepared and inserted on the last day of the conference"). The record does
not explain when or why the Conference decided upon this revision. It appears, however,
this was simply another step in the Conference's effort to restate the substance of three
articles in three simple paragraphs.
336. See supra text accompanying notes 331-33.
337. U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.21, supra note 331, at 17.
338. U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.23, supra note 335, at 7.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 8.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 8-9.
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"[c]ountries should not be permitted to sign the Convention under
the impression that they could then avoid its application by refus-
ing to recognize the validity of arbitral agreements."3' 5 Without
article II, he believed that the Convention would be inferior to the
Geneva Convention of 1927.46 Therefore, he told the delegates
that abandoning the Convention entirely presented a better choice
than modifying it to conform to Belgian demands. 7 With that
said, the debate subsided and the Conference adopted the final text
of article II by twenty-seven votes to two (with five abstentions). 8
As a result, the substance and language of Geneva Protocol article
IV reappeared in article 11(3) of the Convention.
In summary, the lineage and drafting history of article 11(3)
clearly demonstrate that it was never intended to strip courts of the
jurisdiction necessary to grant pre-award attachments. Part II of
this Note has demonstrated that the drafters and signatories of the
Geneva Protocol intended article IV to require courts to surrender
to arbitrators only the power to impose a final resolution of the
merits of disputes that fell within its scope. Consequently, they
understood article IV to require only a stay of litigation. Even
according to McCreary, a court that is obliged to stay proceedings
still retains sufficient jurisdiction over the parties to order interim
measures pending an award.349 Therefore, article IV of the
Geneva Protocol could not have rendered courts incompetent to
order pre-award attachments.
Fearing that the United Nations' draft convention on arbitral
awards would fail of its purpose without some reference to the
validity of arbitration clauses, Sweden fought vigorously for the
inclusion of an article that would republish the spirit of the Geneva
Protocol.350 At every stage-in the Ad Hoc Committee, in its com-
ments and at the Conference-the United Kingdom served as a
345. Id. at 8.
346. Id. Article 7 of the Geneva Convention, supra note 278. extended membership
only to those states that had previously ratified the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration
Clauses.
347. U.N. Doe. EICONF.26/SR.23, supra note 335, at 8-9.
348. United Nations, Economic and Social Council, United Nations Conference on
International Commercial Arbitration, Summary Record (24th mtg.) at 10, U.N. Doc. EF
CONF261SR.24 (1958).
349. See McCreary, 501 F.2d at 1038 ("Unlike § 3 of the federal Act, article 11(3) of the
Convention provides that the court of a contracting state shall 'refer the parties to
arbitration' rather than 'stay the trial of the action.'" (emphasis added)); see also Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 882 F.2d 806,811-12 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that pre-
award attachments are available in chapter 1 cases).
350. See supra text accompanying notes 288-89, 295, 302-03, 325-28.
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key advocate for the Swedish position.35 1 As a result, the Confer-
ence adopted article 11(3), which reenacts the substance and most
of the language of article IV of the Geneva Protocol.352 This, com-
bined with the United Kingdom's intimate understanding of the
Geneva Protocol, helps to explain why English courts have never
questioned their jurisdiction to order pre-award interim measures.
In contrast, the United States never became a member of the
League of Nations. Therefore, it neither signed the Geneva Proto-
col-much less participated in its drafting-nor devoted serious
attention to the drafting of the New York Convention. It never
bothered to comment on the work of the Ad Hoc Committee and
initially resolved not to take part in the Conference. 53 Although
the United States ultimately sent a delegation to the Conference, it
arrived with instructions to participate "in a limited way. ''354
Therefore, it took no part in any of the working sessions.355 It simi-
larly declined even to cast a vote on the question of whether the
Conference should adopt the final text of the Convention as a
whole.35
6
Only this lack of involvement and inquiry can explain why
McCreary, Cooper and their progeny have interpreted article 11(3)
to render courts powerless to hear actions for pre-award attach-
ments.357 To be sure, the near total absence of scholarly works
dedicated to the drafting of the New York Convention has exacer-
bated the uninformed approach of U.S. courts towards the vague
language of article II(3).358 This notwithstanding, the key to under-
standing the meaning of article 11(3) has always remained accessi-
ble. The gap in ready-made scholarly analysis hardly provides
351. See supra text accompanying notes 290, 296-97, 344-48.
352. See supra text accompanying notes 325-48.
353. See supra text accompanying notes 298-99.
354. A. Jason Mirabito, The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: The First Four Years, 5 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L.
471, 486 (1975) (footnote omitted).
355. Id.
356. See Pisar, supra note 219, at 220 n.5.
357. I do not imply that, had they read the Convention's travaux, these courts would
have been inclined to make liberal use of their power to grant pre-award interim measures;
I merely assert that the question of their jurisdiction to hear such actions would have
disappeared.
358. Although van den Berg, supra note 82, provides a detailed analysis of the
Convention's drafting history, this work only discusses how states have subsequently
interpreted article 11(3). It sheds no light upon how this provision made its way into the
Convention. Only Haight, supra note 18, devotes considerable attention to this issue.
Even his work, however, offers only a limited summary of the record.
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sufficient justification for two decades of judicial debate and doctri-
nal chaos.
CONCLUSION
This Note has posed and answered two versions of the following
question: what is the law regarding judicial competence to order
pre-award attachments under the New York Convention? The first
version examined current U.S. law on this issue. This discussion
first exposed the propensity of our courts to resolve the matter on
the basis of unsupported assertions regarding the meaning of arti-
cle 11(3), or on policy grounds. No court has yet to peer into the
Convention's readily accessible travaux. This judicial attitude
towards our international obligations provides cause for reflection
on the role of our judiciary in developing a coherent body of inter-
national law.
Because commentators have, heretofore, given serious consider-
ation only to three seminal cases, this Note also introduced its
audience to the full range of U.S. doctrine on the issue. It
described how our courts have generated a three-way split, the
complexity of which is augmented by a host of illogical exceptions.
Thus, instead of using article 11(3) to facilitate international trans-
actions by reducing the price of dispute resolution, our courts have
imposed additional uncertainty costs. As a result, businesses con-
templating arbitration agreements with companies holding assets in
the United States incur the expense of discovering where those
assets are located and what the local law is regarding interim meas-
ures. Where the law of the jurisdiction is uncertain, the expenses
increase. The parties will discount the probability that they will get
what they want, and each will charge more for its end of the bar-
gain. Even if it is clear that McCreary applies in a given jurisdic-
tion, the cost of uncertainty remains: could a court be persuaded
that this situation presents another suitable exception to the rule?
Because of the effect of conflicting doctrine upon the price of inter-
national business transactions, this Note called for a definitive res-
olution of the meaning of article H(3).
To this end, this Note posed and answered a second version of
the question: according to its drafters, what is the law regarding the
jurisdiction of courts to order pre-award attachments under the
Convention? Pursuant to the differences between English and U.S.
law and the two countries' levels of participation in the Conven-
tion's drafting, this Note examined the Convention's travaux,
which reveals that the Conference adopted article 11(3) for the pur-
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pose of reenacting article IV of the Geneva Protocol. Article IV of
the Protocol, in turn, had required courts only to stay litigation and
to refer the merits of a dispute to arbitration. Even the McCreary
court acknowledged such language provides courts with sufficient
authority to order pre-award attachments.359
In conclusion, the Convention's drafters intended to enhance the
viability of private dispute resolution in order to reduce the overall
costs of international business transactions. Judges who wish to
preserve the integrity of this aim should examine the Convention's
travaux pr~paratoires and accept the fact that article 11(3) does not
strip courts of authority to grant pre-award interim measures. This
would put an end to the expensive controversy that has surrounded
the issue for twenty years. As a result, interim measures will
secure their position in the framework of judicial power that gives
force to privately chosen methods of dispute resolution.
Charles H. Brower, H
359. See supra note 349.
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